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INTRODUCTION
With the flurry of scholarship and public attention devoted
to cases arising under the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, the proceedings in the Court's original docket have
evolved as a not-oft-heeded Eleusinian Mystery of sorts.1 How-
ever, the arcane procedures and delegations of authority used
by the Court in executing its original jurisdiction 2-where the
Supreme Court functions as a trial court-have garnered new-
found attention of late. Much focus became centered on the
Court's final decree in the contentious dispute between New
1. Based on the mythological tale of Demeter, the Goddess of Corn, the
Eleusinian Mysteries were private rituals held every five years by the ancient
Greeks in the temple at Eleusis, near Athens. See EDITH HAMILTON,
MYTHOLOGY 53-64. Because a cloud of secrecy enshrined the ceremonies, the
mysteries have been a source of fascination and curiosity in both ancient and
modern eras; worshippers were bound to a vow of silence, heeding Demeter's
cautionary warning that her secret rites were "mysteries which no one may
utter, for deep awe checks the tongue." Id. at 63.
2. Original jurisdiction "means the power to hear and decide a lawsuit in
the first instance, while appellate jurisdiction means the authority to review
the judgment of another court that has already heard the lawsuit in the first
instance." WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 31 (n. ed. 2001).
While stating that courts of appeals and supreme courts usually exercise only
appellate jurisdiction, Rehnquist recognizes that the Constitution, through
Article III, specifically provides that the United States Supreme Court exer-
cise original jurisdiction in limited cases--cases affecting foreign ambassadors
and cases in which one of the states itself is a party. Id.
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York and New Jersey over the ownership of Ellis Island,3 which
was followed by two decisions resolving two disputes over state
rights to the waters of the Arkansas and Colorado Rivers.4
While the Court was constitutionally charged with acting
as the court of first instance in each of these cases, and in three
more still pending, the Court delegated the bulk of its responsi-
bilities in each case to appointed Special Masters, who were to
issue subpoenas, rule on motions, obtain witness testimony, col-
lect evidence, and, in some cases, preside over trials.5 In New
Jersey v. New York, 6 a contentious dispute dating back to the
early 1800s, a Special Master officiated over the full course of
proceedings for more than two years before formulating a 168-
page report, plus appendices, that set forth both his findings of
fact and his conclusions of law.7 Kansas v. Colorado,8 another
antiquated case dating back more than a century, was assigned
to multiple Special Masters, while Arizona v. California,9 a
comparatively "fresh" case dating back to 1952, was shuffled
through the hands of five Special Masters. In each instance-
the 1999 decision in New Jersey v. New York, the 2000 decision
in Arizona v. California, and the 2001 decision in Kansas v.
Colorado-the Court issued an opinion in substantial harmony
with the respective Special Master's recommendations and pro-
posed decrees.10
Such delegations of authority are not uncommon for the
Court in exercising its original jurisdiction. The Court dele-
gates many of its trial functions to Special Masters, who are
3. New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) (acting under its origi-
nal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that New Jersey retained sovereignty
over certain land-filled portions of Ellis Island, enjoining New York from en-
forcing its laws over those portions).
4. Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S. Ct. 2023 (2001) (exercising its original ju-
risdiction to grant Kansas a remedy for Colorado's diversion of water from the
Arkansas River); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) (exercising its
original jurisdiction to determine states' rights to the Colorado River, and ul-
timately determining that claims brought by various tribes for increased water
rights were not precluded by earlier decisions).
5. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999); see also discussion infra
Part III.B.
7. Office of the Special Master, Final Report of the Special Master, New
Jersey v. New York, No. 120, Orig., available at 1997 WL 291594 (Mar. 31,
1997) [hereinafter Special Master Report].
8. 121 S. Ct. 2023 (2001).
9. 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
10. Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S. Ct. at 2027; Arizona v. California, 530 U.S.
at 418-19 (2000); New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. at 589.
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neither elected nor appointed by an elected body, and has ap-
pointed Special Masters with increasing frequency since the in-
ception of the Court.1 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged the
appointment of Special Masters in original jurisdiction cases as
standard practice. 12  Particularly as the Court's appellate
docket has grown, the Court has delegated greater pockets of
its fact-finding and its legal decision-making authority in origi-
nal jurisdiction cases to Special Masters, who sometimes have
little or no judicial experience and who embark on their duties
with limited guidance or oversight from the Court.1 3
The lack of procedures available to define the processes of
the Special Masters, the Special Masters' autonomy, and the
closed-chamber appointment mechanism for selecting Special
Masters threaten hallmarks of the American judicial system:
open, adversarial processes, judicial accountability, and uni-
formity of judgments. Where once the Special Masters were
limited to issuing subpoenas, obtaining testimony, and produc-
ing reports setting forth evidentiary findings, 14 today they are
poised to invade the province of the Court.15 Because the Court
has held that a "Master's findings... deserve respect and a
tacit presumption of correctness," the Court has been reluc-
tant-though not unwilling16 -to disturb them. Even if Special
Masters have been permitted to wrest too much authority away
from the Court in original jurisdiction cases, the role of the
11. Based on surviving records, the Court delegated authority to gather
and report evidence in fewer than five original jurisdiction cases during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This number grew substantially in the
twentieth century, with the appointment of Special Masters for this purpose
evolving into common practice. See discussion infra Part II.A. & Appendix.
12. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 734 (1981) ("[A]s is usual,
we appointed a Special Master to facilitate handling of the suit.").
13. See Appendix (setting forth the relevant experience of Special Mas-
ters); see also discussion infra Part I.C.
The appointment of Special Masters also implicates social concerns,
including those related to female and minority representation. For example,
the Court has never appointed a woman as Special Master. Hon. John C.
Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Re-
port of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 788
n.1 (1994) ("Turning to Special Masters, during a 60-year period from 1930-
1990, the United States Supreme Court appointed 82 Special Masters ... all
whom were men."); see also Lee Seltman, Working Paper of the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force: Appointments of Special Masters to the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit 8 (1992).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. See discussion infra Part HI.B.
16. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984).
[Vol.86:625
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Special Master should not necessarily be abolished. The Spe-
cial Masters do fulfill important duties that are practical and
arguably necessary, such as collection of evidence. Still, the
role of Special Master is one that should be scrupulously cir-
cumscribed.
In light of the lack of institutional oversight or accountabil-
ity of the Special Masters, this Article examines the confines of
the Special Masters' authority, explores the reasons for the
Court's heavy reliance on Special Masters, and studies the in-
terplay between the Special Master and the Court in modern
practice, focusing on the much-noted dispute between New
York and New Jersey.17 Part I provides both a historical and
contemporary overview of the Court's original jurisdiction, de-
fining both the constitutional authority for the jurisdiction and
the nature of original jurisdiction cases. Part II explores the
evolution of the Court's use of Special Masters, as well as the
procedures and practices Special Masters use in carrying out
their duties. Part III presents the relatively recent Ellis Island
dispute of New Jersey v. New York as a case study of the Spe-
cial Master-Court relationship. Part IV discusses the constitu-
tional difficulties posed by Special Masters, suggesting that the
Special Masters' authority should be modified given the sub-
stantial interests of the states litigating original jurisdiction
cases before the Court. In conclusion, Part V presents the most
constitutionally sound and feasible modifications to the practice
of using Special Masters.
As discussed in Part V, the Court, at a minimum, should
articulate additional procedures to guide original jurisdiction
proceedings to partially resolve the difficulties posed by the role
of the Special Master. Such procedures are necessary to ensure
that the Court, as the Article III court to which original juris-
diction cases are committed, retains sufficient control. Further,
either the Court or Congress should restore greater responsibil-
ity to the Court or institutionalize the preferred practice of ap-
pointing senior or retired federal judges as Special Masters.
Alternatively, Congress could either establish a specialized fed-
eral court to share concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court or provide that the federal district courts shall share con-
current jurisdiction.
17. The report from New Jersey v. New York is used as a case study for
this Article because it is the most widely available. See Special Master Report,
supra note 7.
2002] 629
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Each of the proposed solutions either fails to redress all of
the difficulties presented by the current use of Special Masters
or presents new practical difficulties of its own. Redirecting
Special Master functions to the Court could potentially resolve
almost all of the difficulties posed by the role of Special Mas-
ters, but the Court, given both that it is the beneficiary of Spe-
cial Masters' services in original jurisdiction cases and that it
has prioritized its appellate docket duties, is unlikely to reclaim
greater authority or declare the use of Special Masters uncon-
stitutional. A specialized court would allow for the develop-
ment of institutional knowledge over time by Article III judges,
but history also has shown that specialized courts are disfa-
vored and often ill-fated. Concurrent jurisdiction in the federal
district courts has proven adequate for adjudication of many
categories of original jurisdiction cases, but is not well-suited
for disputes in which the Court's original jurisdiction remains
exclusive-state-against-state disputes-because state bounda-
ries are coterminous with federal district boundaries. Concur-
rent original jurisdiction exercised by the federal district
courts, therefore, could create interstate tensions between ad-
judicator and litigant. The increased application of procedures
limits the discretion of Special Masters, but does not curtail
their extra-constitutional authority. Finally, appointing senior
or retired federal judges would place the powers of the Special
Master into the hands of an Article III adjudicator, yet the
ranks of senior and retired federal judges, at present, suffer
from underrepresentation of women and minorities.
Assuming that the Special Master's broad discretion and
the lack of oversight by an Article III court are the overarching
difficulties to be resolved-and taking into account the practi-
cal considerations posed by each of the proposed solutions-the
combination of two solutions rises to the forefront: increased
application of procedures and reinstitution of senior or retired
judges as Special Masters. Increased application of procedures
is the least intrusive and most easily implemented means of
limiting the discretion of Special Masters and bringing original
jurisdiction cases within the rubric of all other cases brought
within the American justice system. The practice of appointing
senior or retired federal judges, while currently resulting in a
lack of diversity, would ensure that the Special Master func-
tions were carried out by an Article III adjudicator. The under-
representation of women and minorities would occur within
what is hopefully only an interim period until representation of
630 [Vol.86:625
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various protected groups increased.
I. THE COURTS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN
PERSPECTIVE
A. THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CLAUSE
The Original Jurisdiction Clause, located in Article III,
Section Two, Clause Two of the Constitution, provides that "[in
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the su-
preme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."18 In its first
decade, the Supreme Court interpreted this constitutional
grant of original jurisdiction as self-executing and unassailable
by Congress. 19
The bounds of the Court's original jurisdiction were firmly
established in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.20
Under the facts of Marbury, Marbury, being neither an ambas-
sador nor a state, could not bring a lawsuit in the Court under
a strict application of the original jurisdiction provision of Arti-
cle III "because he was asking the Supreme Court to grant him
relief in the first instance, without his ever having gone to a
lower court."21 Marbury had sought relief in the Court under
the authority of the Judiciary Act of 1789, through which Con-
gress had expanded the Court's original jurisdiction. The Court
heard the case, only to declare that Congress was without
power to expand the constitutional limitation on the Court's
original jurisdiction. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "If
[Clongress remains at liberty to give this [Clourt appellate ju-
risdiction, where the [C] onstitution has declared their jurisdic-
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
19. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451, 463-64, 479 (1793);
see also HANNIS TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 41-42, 44 (1905). The Court's exercise of appel-
late jurisdiction, in contrast, is constitutionally sound only when consistent
with enabling legislation enacted by Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c.
2.
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 31-
32. Rehnquist notes that the Court was without jurisdiction over the case of
Marbury v. Madison because the criteria for original jurisdiction were not met,
but that the Court heard and decided the case in order to declare that it was
without jurisdiction, as well as make the more familiar pronouncement that
"[iut is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
21. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 31.
2002]
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tion shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the
[C]onstitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribu-
tion of jurisdiction, made in the [Clonstitution, is form without
substance."22
Notwithstanding Marshall's holding in Marbury that the
Court's original jurisdiction can be subject neither to accretion
nor to diminution, the Court and Congress have over time ger-
rymandered the boundaries of the Court's original jurisdiction,
providing that the Court maintains exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in some categories of disputes,23 concurrent original juris-
diction-shared with the federal district courts-in others,24
and no jurisdiction over cases precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment or cases falling outside the purview of the Court's
original jurisdiction as contemplated by the Framers.25 Conse-
quently, in modem Supreme Court jurisprudence, the only
category of cases in which the Court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction is controversies between states, despite the consti-
tutional enumeration of cases falling within the Court's original
jurisdiction. 26
With regard to state party disputes, Congress, since 1789,
has provided that the Supreme Court "shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more
states,"2 7 even if other non-state parties are present in the liti-
gation.28 The Court in 1792 explained Congress's definition of
"original jurisdiction" with regard to disputes between states:
"[W]henever a state is a party, the [S]upreme [C]ourt has ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the suit; and her right cannot be effec-
tually supported... by a voluntary appearance before another
22. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 27-36.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) (emphasis added). By contrast, other origi-
nal jurisdiction cases, such as those "affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls," can be heard in the federal district courts, where Con-
gress has provided that these lower federal courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction shared with the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1; see
28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1) (1994).
28. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 744-45 n.21 (1981) (in-
volving the inclusion of seventeen intervening pipelines companies); California
v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 61 (1979) (involving the inclusion of the United States
as a party); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963) (involving the in-
clusion of the United States as a party).
632 [Vol.86:625
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tribunal of the Union."29 The exclusive nature of the Court's
original jurisdiction thus requires the Court to function in all
respects as a trial court, or a court of first instance, in cases be-
tween state opponents.30
In many of the remaining categories of original jurisdiction
cases, by contrast, Congress-without unconstitutionally rob-
bing the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction-has incre-
mentally vested the federal district courts with concurrent
original jurisdiction, which permits the district courts to enter-
tain the suits without regard to the Court's jurisdiction to hear
those cases. 31 More specifically, the Judiciary Act of 1789, as
revised in 1978, provides that the Supreme Court "shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction" over actions involving
ambassadors, public ministers or other foreign consulate offi-
cers, controversies by the United States against a state, and all
actions or proceedings by a state against non-citizen persons. 32
29. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 406 (1792). Georgia v.
Brailsford, the fourth case decided by the Court under its original jurisdiction,
involved a claim by the state of Georgia that it should be allowed to intervene
in a dispute between two private parties regarding debt and property that
Georgia claimed by right of a state confiscation act. See id. at 402-04.
30. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 31-32 (distinguishing the Court's role
in cases of original jurisdiction from its role in cases of appellate jurisdiction).
For an instructive (but somewhat outdated) discussion of original ju-
risdiction in the United States, as compared and contrasted with original ju-
risdiction in selected other nations, see generally W. J. Wagner, Original Ju-
risdiction of National Supreme Courts, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 217 (1959),
which examines the establishment and scope of original jurisdiction in the
United States, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and Switzerland.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994). The district court's concurrent original ju-
risdiction allows it to entertain original jurisdiction cases that would other-
wise be committed to the Supreme Court. The availability of district courts to
entertain original jurisdiction cases has led the Court to dismiss original ju-
risdiction cases without prejudice to be brought in the district courts, provid-
ing that the Court is not obliged to exercise its original jurisdiction where an
alternative forum is available. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73,
77 (1992) (citing cases).
With respect to proceedings against foreign officials, Congress
amended the Court's original jurisdiction in 1978 to provide that the district
courts hold concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court, based on
a policy determination that the Supreme Court not be burdened by such pro-
ceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b); S. REP. No. 95-1108, at 8, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1941, 1946-47; see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 472 (6th ed. 1985).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (emphasis added). Although disputes between
states are now the only category of disputes in the Court's exclusive original
jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over proceedings against foreign officials was
exclusive until 1978. See id.
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Congress's vesting of concurrent authority in the district courts
is consonant with Chief Justice Marshall's adage in Cohens v.
Virginia33 that the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction
to the Court does not deprive other federal courts of original ju-
risdiction over the same categories of cases:
It may be conceded, that where the case is of such a nature as to ad-
mit of its originating in the Supreme Court, it ought to originate
there; but where, from its nature, it cannot originate in that Court,
these words ought not to be so construed as to require it. There are
many cases in which it would be found extremely difficult, and sub-
versive of the spirit of the [Clonstitution, to maintain the construc-
tion .... 34
Although it is the currently prevailing view, Marshall's
view has not always been the controlling view, and both inten-
tionalist and strict textualist readings of the Constitution dem-
onstrate that it might not be the correct one. First, a draft of
Article III that was debated at the Constitutional Convention
provided for concurrent original jurisdiction in any of the lower
federal courts ordained and established by Congress.3 5 The
draft provision was stricken during debate, prior to ratifica-
tion.36 From an intentionalist perspective, therefore, Mar-
shall's conclusion seems contrary to the intent of the Framers.
Second, while a strict textualist reading might be "subversive
to the spirit" of the Constitution, at least one Justice writing in
the eighteenth century, Justice Iredell, believed that the Origi-
nal Jurisdiction Clause made original jurisdiction exclusive and
barred the Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over
cases within its original jurisdiction. 37 Justice Iredell's adher-
ence to his strict textual reading of the Original Jurisdiction
Clause sparked a national controversy that, in turn, spurred
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
The impetus for the Eleventh Amendment grew swiftly and
sharply following Justice Iredell's opinion for the Court in the
33. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
34. Id. at 395. This proposition was further ratified by the Court in Ames
v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884), in which the Court held that it was "unable to
say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of
the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been
vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction." Id. at 469.
35. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 294 n.3 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
36. See id. at 295 n.3.
37. See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Ju-
dicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REv. 329, 343-44 (1995).
[Vol.86:625
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1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia,38 the Court's third original
jurisdiction case. In Chisholm, the Court held that the Consti-
tution contemplated that an unconsenting state could be sub-
ject to a suit brought before the Court by the citizen of a sister
state.39 The proposition gained immediate notoriety and "fell
upon the country with a profound shock."40 The Congressional
response was to propose, only one day after the Chisholm deci-
sion, the Eleventh Amendment.41 The Eleventh Amendment,
which was ratified by the states in January 1798, reads as fol-
lows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."42
38. 2 U.S. (2 DOll.) 419 (1793).
39. Id. at 420-22, 425, 431.
40. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999) (citing 1 CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926)). In Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890), the Court summarized the congressional
response to the Chisholm decision:
[Chisholm] created such a shock of surprise throughout the country
that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed,
and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States. This
amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the
whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually re-
versed the decision of the Supreme Court.
Id.
41. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 71; William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Af-
firmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdic-
tion, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1058-60 (1983); Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitu-
tional Politics, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 555 (2001).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The historical notes to the Eleventh Amend-
ment read as follows:
This amendment was proposed to the legislatures of the several
States by the Third Congress, on March 4, 1794; and was declared in
a message from the President to Congress, dated January 8, 1798, to
have been ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States.
The States which ratified this amendment, and the dates of ratifica-
tion are: New York, Mar. 27, 1794; Rhode Island, Mar. 31, 1794; Con-
necticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794; Massachu-
setts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, between Oct. 9 and Nov. 9, 1794;
Virginia, Nov. 18, 1794; Georgia, Nov. 29, 1794; Kentucky, Dec. 7,
1794; Maryland, Dec. 26, 1794; Delaware, Jan. 23, 1795; North Caro-
lina, Feb. 7, 1795; and South Carolina, Dec. 4, 1797.
This amendment was passed in consequence of the decision of
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), which
held that a state could be sued by a citizen of another state in as-
sumpsit.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI historical notes.
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Thus the Eleventh Amendment removed from the purview of
all federal courts cases once thought to fall under the Court's
original jurisdiction. Further, the Eleventh Amendment has
been interpreted to deprive all federal courts of jurisdiction
over cases between states and private citizens, without extend-
ing as far as disputes between two or more states.43 To some,
the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment appears to have been
"to strike out a specific clause of Article III of the Constitu-
tion"--part of the Original Jurisdiction Clause."
The survival of exclusive original jurisdiction for state-
against-state suits, but not for the other delineated categories
of original jurisdiction cases, might be tethered to the Constitu-
tional Convention's preoccupation with state-against-state dis-
putes as the impetus for the Original Jurisdiction Clause.45
The sole references to the establishment of original jurisdiction
during the Constitutional Convention point to contentious and
prevalent boundary disputes as one area in which the Articles
of Confederation had proven defective. 46 At the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, boundary disputes were pending
between eleven of the thirteen states, suggesting that members
of the Convention explicitly understood that disputes between
states would occupy the federal courts. 47 Yet some scholars ar-
gue that "the draft Constitution did not contemplate judicial
cognizance of border disputes, and thus must have had other
kinds of controversies in mind" in creating original jurisdiction
in the federal courts for state-against-state disputes.48
43. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). For a case
to fall within the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore to be ex-
empt from federal judicial power, the Court in a subsequent case held that the
suit must implicate the state by name, not as a party in interest, in which the
state has a partial proprietary interest in one of the parties to the suit. See
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 908
(1824).
44. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Re-
view, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283,
1288 (2000).
45. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 6-8.
46. See id.; TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 82-84.
47. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 83-84 (citing Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838)).
48. James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Ac-
count of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1301 & n.142
(1998) (noting that an early draft "assigned to Congress authority over bound-
ary disputes between states (as had the Articles of Confederation), and specifi-
cally barred the federal courts from hearing interstate disputes 'regard[ing]
Territory or Jurisdiction"). Instead, Pfander suggests that original jurisdic-
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Under the Articles, border disputes were to be settled by
ad hoc tribunals established by the states;4 9 Congress was to be
the tribunal of last resort for disputes "between two or more
states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause
whatever."50 Although the ad hoc tribunal was utilized only
once under the Articles of Confederation, 51 despite a burgeon-
ing array of disputes that had erupted between states over the
location of their borders,52 this mechanism for handling bound-
ary disputes was viewed as fatally deficient. The deficiency of
the Articles was that resolution of interstate disputes, as a pre-
liminary matter, would have required the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between the sovereign states or would have
led potentially to a host of skirmishes by states attempting
resolution by a resort to force, just as with border disputes be-
tween international sovereigns. 53
tion over state-party suits was intended to facilitate debt allocation and collec-
tion for debt flowing from the Revolutionary War. Id. at 1301 n.143.
49. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 6 n.31 (explaining the process
by which the tribunals were formed and noting the only case resolved under
this system); MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 342 (1950) ("Ancient dis-
putes about boundaries and navigation rights were discussed and settled rap-
idly.... The usual procedure was for the states concerned to appoint commis-
sioners, and, once these had agreed, for the legislatures to adopt the
agreement, a process still followed as problems arise among American
states."); see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888) (re-
fusing to grant original jurisdiction to an action upon which a state, in its own
courts, obtained a money judgment from action of another state).
50. Articles of Confederation, art. IX, reprinted in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED x (The American Law Book Co. 1924) (1778). For
a discussion of the British Privy Council's resolution of colonial boundary dis-
putes prior to the revolution, see TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 82-83.
51. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 6 n.31. The presiding ad hoc
tribunal unanimously voted against Connecticut in its battle with Pennsyl-
vania over property located in present-day Wyoming. Id.
52. See 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 26 (1911).
53. See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme
Court's Management of its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L.
REV. 185, 185 (1993) (noting that stakes in disputes between states are often
as high as those in disputes between international sovereigns, which usually
result in force or negotiation); Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 669 (1959) (discussing the simi-
larities in the resolution of interstate and international disputes and a poten-
tial international tribunal modeled on the Court's treatment of interstate dis-
putes); see also Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893) (noting that
original jurisdiction was established in order for the Court to resolve boundary
disputes that "otherwise might be the fruitful cause of prolonged and harass-
ing conflicts").
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Because the Supreme Court was the only federal court
mandated by the Constitution,54 an impartial national tribunal
was the necessary and preferred alternative to leaving such
disputes to the ad hoc state tribunals.55 Only by committing
such actions to the Supreme Court could state-against-state
cases circumvent the abuses that the Framers were certain
would result if such disputes were left to resolution by state
court judges.56
As might be expected, given the concerns articulated at the
Constitutional Convention, boundary disputes have com-
prised-and continue to comprise-the bulk of the Court's
original docket.57 One of the first border disputes resolved un-
der the new rubric of the Constitution was between New Jersey
and New York in 1831,58 involving the dispute over Ellis Island
and surrounding islands. New Jersey later filed new actions to
determine its rights to Ellis Island because of the changing ge-
ography of the islands. Thus, the Ellis Island dispute contin-
ued to percolate in the Court until the 1999 final decree.59
B. CASES ARISING UNDER THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CLAUSE
As of the late 1990s, the Court has decided roughly 170
original jurisdiction cases in its more than two hundred years
54. The Constitution provides only for "such inferior [federal] Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1.
55. See James Brown Scott The Role of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Settlement of Inter-State Disputes, 15 GEO. L.J. 146, 165-67
(1927).
56. Some scholars argue that although states could have invoked common
law immunities or separate-sovereign immunities, such actions would have
escaped the Court's appellate jurisdiction because neither of these immunities
had their origin in federal law. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme
Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 558-60
(1994).
57. E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1998); Louisiana
v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458, 459 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 284, 290 (1831); see also TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 57 (pointing out that,
aside from cases between states involving boundary disputes, there are few
other cases where the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was involved in
controversies between states).
58. See New Jersey v. New York, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 461, 461-67 (1830); 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1831); Special Master Report, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing
the history of the New Jersey-New York boundary dispute); Scott, supra note
55, at 170.
59. New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589, 589-90 (1999).
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of existence.60 Despite the limited number of cases, the Court's
original jurisdiction has brought a variety of disputes between
sovereign states within its reach, including disputes over water
apportionment and interstate commercial burdens. 61 Water
disputes include controversies in the western states regarding
the control of water rights and the diversion of state waters.62
States also have litigated to curtail burdensome commercial ac-
tivities and restrictions imposed by another state63 or to collect
sizable estate taxes, as when California and Texas battled over
the right to tax Howard Hughes' estate.64 Other cases include
disputes over which state has the right to profits from un-
claimed securities belonging to unidentified holders65 and the
apportionment of Civil War-era state debt following West Vir-
ginia's secession from the Commonwealth of Virginia to join
Union forces. 66
In order to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction, a state
party must make a motion for leave to file in the Court. While
the jurisdiction appears mandatory, the Court votes on whether
to grant leave to allow the filing of a complaint commencing an
original jurisdiction action; a majority of the Court must vote to
grant leave, as compared with the four votes necessary to grant
a writ of certiorari invoking the Court's appellate jurisdiction.6 7
In evaluating whether leave shall be granted, the Court scruti-
nizes the pleading under a heightened "clear and convincing"
standard, consistent with its declaration that "the burden of
60. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (6th ed. 1993);
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1995).
61. See Appendix. With regard to environmental concerns, a state may
sue in a representative capacity or as parens patriae to enjoin pollution of its
resources from a neighboring state. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907). A state has a right to sue on behalf of its citizens as
parens patriae if "the injury alleged affects the general population of a State in
a substantial way." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737 (1981). The
Court has narrowly circumscribed this right, however, foreclosing the oppor-
tunity for states to sue as a "nominal party in order to forward the claims of
individual citizens." Id.
62. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1902) (finding the
dispute over Colorado's diversion of Arkansas River and tributaries, contrary
to the rights of Kansas, justiciable under the Court's original jurisdiction).
63. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 581-82 (1923)
(challenging a proposal by a neighboring state to restrict the interstate supply
of natural gas).
64. California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 602 (1978) (per curiam).
65. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 494-95 (1993).
66. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 209 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1908).
67. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 299.
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proof that [the complaining state] must carry in this case is
much greater than that imposed on the ordinary plaintiff in a
suit between private individuals."68 The Court therefore has
rejected any notion that the presence of a state as a party is
dispositive proof that the case falls within its original jurisdic-
tion.69 The Court also has articulated that its original jurisdic-
tion "is limited and manifestly intended to be sparingly exer-
cised."'70
Whatever the Court's intention to limit the scope and exer-
cise of its original jurisdiction, under a theory of strict construc-
tion it cannot refuse to entertain cases falling within its origi-
nal jurisdiction if no other forum is available. 71 The Court has,
however, refused to grant leave to states to file cases it regards
as picayune,72 such as when the state of California filed a con-
tract action against the state of West Virginia in 1981 based on
the failure of a West Virginia state university football team to
play a California state team.73 The Court denied California
leave to file its complaint, although the Court gave no basis for
its denial, and it appears that no other forum was available to
hear the suit.74 Whether the Court has the constitutional au-
thority to deny leave in such circumstances is open to dispute.
Justice Stevens, dissenting from the denial of leave in Califor-
nia v. West Virginia, argued that the Court could not justify its
68. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 387 (1923).
69. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERIcAN PoLITIcs 197, 207 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that 95% of the thousands
of cases filed fall within the Court's appellate docket, with only approximately
ten cases per term falling within the Court's original jurisdiction, including
those carried over from prior terms due to their complexity).
70. California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261 (1895).
71. See The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black.) 522, 526 (1861)
("[Tihe court could not... refuse to exercise a power with which it was clothed
by the Constitution and laws...."); Fisher v. Cockerell, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248,
259 (1831) ("As this court has never grasped at ungranted jurisdiction, so will
it never, we trust, shrink from the exercise of that which is conferred upon
it.").
72. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) (stating view that
original jurisdiction is "obligatory only in appropriate cases. And the question
of what is appropriate concerns, of course, the seriousness and dignity of the
claim .... ").
73. California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027 (1981); see also Complaint
for Damages, California v. West Virginia (No. __) at 3-4 (seeking damages for
breach of "an agreement that the two [state] schools engage in two intersec-
tional, inter-collegiate football games").
74. See California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. at 1027-28 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the Court should not decline its exclusive jurisdiction).
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denial where jurisdiction in cases between the two states was
committed to the Court and was exclusive: "The fact that two
sovereign States have been unable to resolve this matter with-
out adding to our burdens does not speak well for the states-
manship of either party but does not, in my opinion, justify our
refusal to exercise our exclusive jurisdiction... .,75 Justice
Stevens, incidentally, would have granted leave, but would
have "refer[red] the case to a Special Master. 7 6
As a basis for justifying refusals to entertain original juris-
diction cases, the Court has cited the burdens imposed by both
its appellate docket and Section 1251, which the Court has in-
terpreted "as providing us with substantial discretion to make
case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of an origi-
nal forum in this Court for particular disputes within our con-
stitutional original jurisdiction.7 7 Consistent with this discre-
tion, in Massachusetts v. Missouri 8 the Court avowed its
qualified authority to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, given
that "the broad statement that a court having jurisdiction must
exercise it is not universally true."79 As Justice Jackson once
noted, the Court is "a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, narrow
processes, and small capacity for handling mass litigation."80
II. CALLED TO WORIM THE SPECIAL MASTERS' ROLE IN
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION LITIGATION
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
The first appearance of a person or body appointed by the
Court to execute some of the Court's trial court functions in an
original jurisdiction case occurred in the first case ever filed in
the Supreme Court, the 1791 case of Vanstophorst v. Mary-
75. Id. at 1028.
76. Id.
77. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983); see also Mississippi v.
Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992) ("We first exercised this discretion not to ac-
cept original actions in cases within our nonexclusive original jurisdiction....
But we have since carried over its exercise to actions between two States,
where our jurisdiction is exclusive." (citations omitted)).
Between 1961 and 1991, the Court denied nearly half of the motions
for leave to file a complaint by states seeking to invoke the Court's original ju-
risdiction. See McKusick, supra note 53, at 188-89.
78. 308 U.S. 1 (1939).
79. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
80. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SuPREiE COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT 25 (1955).
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land.81 The dispute arose over repayment of a loan obtained by
the state of Maryland during the Revolution from creditors
abroad.8 2 In 1782, a Baltimore merchant named Matthew
Ridley traveled to Europe on behalf of the state of Maryland to
borrow funds to support Maryland's war effort against the Brit-
ish.8 3 Unable to obtain a loan in France from Louis XIV's min-
istry, which was willing to lend to a national entity but not a
state entity, Ridley traveled to Holland and obtained a loan
from the van Staphorst brothers, who were Dutch sympathizers
of the American Revolution.8 4 By the time Ridley returned to
Maryland, the British threat had waned, and the terms of the
loan were met with disfavor.85 When Maryland failed to live up
to the terms of the agreement, the van Staphorsts issued a
summons to the governor and council of Maryland, and the suit
was heard by the Supreme Court on the first day that the Jus-
tices ever convened to hear cases.86 When difficulty arose in
contacting witnesses in the case, many of whom were located in
Amsterdam, Attorney General Edmund Randolph moved for
the establishment of a commission. The Court granted the mo-
tion and published its decision to appoint a commission to
travel to Holland to take testimony from witnesses in the
case.87 The list of seven Court-approved commissioners was
compiled by the Attorney General in conjunction with the coun-
selor for Maryland.88 The case was ultimately resolved by set-
81. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791); see 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 17-18 (Maeva Marcus
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT]
(providing the historical background of the case).
82. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 81, at 7.
83. See id. (explaining that the governor and assembly of Maryland had
authorized the merchant to obtain a loan on which the interest would be paid
in tobacco and flour).
84. See id. at 7-8 (citing the journal and correspondence of Matthew
Ridley). About the same time, the Vanstophorsts concluded an agreement
with ambassador John Adams to loan funds to Congress. Id. at 8.
85. See id. at 10-13. Ridley was authorized to provide that interest would
be paid in tobacco up to a maximum amount; the agreement as executed pro-
vided that the Vanstophorsts were to receive this maximum, even if it ex-
ceeded the value of interest owed on the debt. See id.
86. See id. at 16-18 (stating that plaintiffs served a summons on the gov-
ernor and council of Maryland to appear before the Supreme Court at the be-ginning of its 1791 term).
87. Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791).
88. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 81, at
19. Strangely, the group was comprised of persons all having close ties to the
Vanstophorsts, although three commissioners were assigned to represent the
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tlement, precluding any need for the Court to decide the suit on
its merits. 89
Commissioners were appointed at least one additional time
before the close of the eighteenth century, though in this in-
stance they were appointed to obtain the testimony of wit-
nesses located in the various states.90 In these early times, the
appointment of persons other than the Justices to take evi-
dence was necessary in original jurisdiction cases, given both
the limited modes of transportation and travel necessary to
gather evidence and the already burdensome circuit-riding re-
sponsibilities of the Justices. 91
Commissioners continued to be appointed in a handful of
original jurisdiction cases throughout the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, though acting not as often as fact-finder but
more as technicians responsible for demarcating a border con-
sistent with a Court decree.92 This more technical role is con-
sistent with the role of state-appointed commissioners who es-
tablished boundaries in pursuit of or in pursuance to state
compacts entered into with respect to state boundaries.9 3
Vanstophorsts' interests and four were assigned to represent Maryland's in-
terests. Id.
89. See id. at 19-20.
90. See, e.g., Huger v. South Carolina, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 339, 342 (1797)
("Complainant... moved for and obtained Commissions, to take the examina-
tion of witnesses in several of the States.").
91. See 2 GEORGE L. HASKmNS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 114 (1981) ("[The almost unbearable hardships of cir-
cuit riding, which were caused in part by the scarce and primitive transporta-
tion facilities in undeveloped portions of the country, continued to result in
accidents, delays, and fatigue.").
92. Compare Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 50 U.S. (9
How.) 647, 656-58 (1850) (appointing a commissioner to obtain further evi-
dence and draft a report to the Court), and Oklahoma v. Texas, 257 U.S. 621
(1922) (per curiam) (appointing a commissioner "to take and return testimony
in this cause"), with Missouri v. Iowa, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 1, 1-2 (1850) (appoint-
ing a commissioner "to run and mark the boundary line between said states,
according to our decree"), and Indiana v. Kentucky, 159 U.S. 275, 277 (1895)
(appointing commissioners "to ascertain and run the boundary line between
the said states of Indiana and Kentucky as designated in the said opinion of
this court").
93. See Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1990) (noting
that commissioners appointed by each state convened in 1787 and produced
the Treaty of Beaufort, which established boundaries of the states and was
subsequently ratified by the state legislatures); see also New Jersey v. New
York, 523 U.S. 767, 772-73 (1998) (noting that New Jersey and New York
jointly appointed commissioners to resolve their boundary dispute); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 505 (1893) (discussing the historic role of commis-
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Early in the twentieth century, the fact-finding functions
that the Court initially charged to a commission or commis-
sioner instead came to be vested in a "Special Master."94 This
transition began in the Virginia suit brought against West Vir-
ginia for the apportionment of Virginia's debt as it existed at
the time of West Virginia's secession during the Civil War.95
Even after the creation of the role of Special Master, however,
the distinction between the roles of a commissioner as com-
pared with a Special Master remained murky.96 In some in-
stances, for example, an order appointing a commissioner dif-
fered little from an order appointing a Special Master, making
any distinction untenable. 97
B. THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
The selection and appointment mechanism for Special
Masters is not publicly known.98 When a vacancy occurs while
the Court is in recess, the Chief Justice alone is granted the au-
thority to appoint a Special Master or commissioner,99 although
sioners appointed by the respective states to locate boundaries between Vir-
ginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina).
94. See Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 297 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("While commissioners were appointed in the early years, the prac-
tice this century has been to use Special Masters.").
95. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 209 U.S. 514, 534-37 (1908) (referring
the matter to a Special Master); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554,
566 n.11 (1983) ("On occasion in the past, before the device of appointing Spe-
cial Masters in original jurisdiction cases became common, we have gone so far
as to appoint a commission with broad powers to resolve factual questions in a
controversy between two States .... .") (citation omitted).
96. A commissioner serving in the capacity of executing the decree and
demarcating the boundary is often an engineer or surveying expert appointed
because of his expertise to demarcate the actual boundary. See, e.g., Arkansas
v. Tennessee, 399 U.S. 219 (1970) (a surveyor); New Mexico v. Texas, 276 U.S.
558, 559 (1928) (a geodetic and astronomic engineer). In at least one case, the
commissioner was a judicial officer authorized to engage a surveyor to demar-
cate the boundary as set forth in the Court's decree. See Arkansas v. Tennes-
see, 397 U.S. 88, 90 (1970).
97. Compare United States v. Louisiana, 318 U.S. 743, 743 (1943) (ap-
pointing a commissioner "for the purpose of perpetuating testimony, with au-
thority to summon witnesses at the request of the parties, to issue subpoenas,
and to take such evidence as may be introduced and such additional testimony
as he may deem it necessary to call for"), with Colorado v. Kansas, 361 U.S.
645, 645 (1942) (appointing a Special Master "with authority to summon wit-
nesses, issue subpoenas, and to take such evidence as he may deem it neces-
sary to call for").
98. Telephone Interview with Francis J. Lorson, Chief Deputy Clerk, Su-
preme Court of the United States (Mar. 31, 2000).
99. See Illinois v. Kentucky, 480 U.S. 903, 903 (1987) ("It is further or-
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this appears to have occurred only once.100 By inference, then,
the majority of appointments likely result from some degree of
joint decision or assent among the Justices. Logically, one
might expect persons appointed as Special Master to have ap-
plied for the position or have been nominated or solicited to fill
the role. The Court's early appointment memoranda, however,
occasionally provided for the appointment of a different Special
Master if the initial appointment was "not accepted," suggest-
ing that the appointment was not always a product of mutual
understanding. 01
While no special qualifications have been set for the Spe-
cial Master role, Special Masters today often are appointed
from the ranks of senior or retired federal judges, 10 2 which,
given the underrepresentation of women on the federal bench,
dered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during
a recess of the Court, the Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new
designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the
Court."); Kansas v. Colorado, 478 U.S. 1018, 1019 (1986) (same); New Jersey v.
Nevada, 474 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1986) (same); California v. Texas, 459 U.S. 963,
964 (1982) (same); Arkansas v. Mississippi, 458 U.S. 1119, 1119 (1982) (same);
Texas v. New Mexico, 454 U.S. 1076, 1076 (1981) (same); Texas v. Oklahoma,
448 U.S. 905, 905 (1980) (same); Maryland v. Louisiana, 445 U.S. 913, 913
(1980) (same); United States v. Alaska, 444 U.S. 1065, 1065 (1980) (same);
California v. Arizona, 441 U.S. 959, 959 (1979) (same); Kentucky v. Indiana,
441 U.S. 941, 941 (1979) (same); New York v. Illinois, 441 U.S. 921, 921 (1979)
(same); Colorado v. New Mexico, 441 U.S. 902, 902 (1979) (same); Tennessee v.
Arkansas, 439 U.S. 1061, 1061 (1979) (same); Arizona v. California, 439 U.S.
419, 419, 436-37 (1979) (per curiam) (same); Georgia v. South Carolina, 434
U.S. 1057, 1058 (1978) (same); United States v. Maine, 433 U.S. 917, 918
(1977) (same); California v. Nevada, 433 U.S. 918, 918 (1977) (same); Idaho ex
rel. Evans v. Oregon, 431 U.S. 952, 952 (1977) (same); Texas v. New Mexico,
423 U.S. 942, 943 (1975) (same); Mississippi v. Arkansas, 402 U.S. 926, 927
(1971) (same); Nebraska v. Iowa, 392 U.S. 918, 918-19 (1968) (same); Arkan-
sas v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1968) (same); Michigan v. Ohio, 386
U.S. 1029, 1029 (1967) (same); Illinois v. Missouri, 386 U.S. 902, 902 (1967)
(same); Ohio v. Kentucky, 385 U.S. 803, 803 (1966) (same); Illinois v. Missouri,
384 U.S. 924, 924 (1966) (same); Nebraska v. Iowa, 380 U.S. 968, 968 (1965)
(same); Nebraska v. Iowa, 379 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1965) (same); Illinois v. Indi-
ana, 321 U.S. 752, 752 (1944) (same); Colorado v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 645, 645
(1942) (same); Washington v. Oregon, 288 U.S. 592, 592 (1933) (per curiam)
(same).
100. See Missouri v. Iowa, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 1, 2 (1850) ("[Tihe said [Com-
missioner] Brown having died, the Hon. Robert W. Wells was appointed in
room and stead of said Brown by the Chief Justice of this court, in vacation.").
101. E.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 278 U.S. 557, 558 (1928) (per curiam)
(stating that "[i]f the appointment herein made of a Special Master is not ac-
cepted ... the Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation").
102. See BAUM, supra note 60, at 11; STERN ET AL., supra note 31, at 496;
see also Appendix.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:625
helps explain why no Special Master in an original jurisdiction
case has been a woman.10 3 On three occasions, even retired or
former Supreme Court Justices have sat as Special Masters.10 4
Former Associate Justice Charles Evans Hughes was the first
former Court member appointed Special Master, to serve as
Special Master in 1926 to preside over the protracted litigation
against Illinois by other states bordering the Great Lakes.105 A
former governor of New York, 106 Hughes had sat on the Court
from 1910 to 1916,107 but left the Court when he obtained the
Republican Party's nomination for President.10 8 Interestingly,
Hughes was reappointed to the Court as Chief Justice in
1930,109 the same year that the Court entered its decree in the
Illinois dispute. 110 Retired Justice Stanley Reed was appointed
in 1958 to handle a dispute between Virginia and Maryland
over marine life in the Potomac River, 1 and Retired Justice
Tom Clark was appointed Special Master in 1973 in a boundary
dispute between New Hampshire and Maine. 112
The practice of appointing senior or retired judges was
formalized by Chief Justice Warren Burger beginning in the
late 1960s. 113 This unwritten rule was relaxed over time as the
resources of federal judges were deemed more worthy of devo-
103. See Coughenour et al., supra note 13, at 788 n.1; Seltman, supra note
13, at 8.
104. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 414 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1973) (ap-
pointing retired Justice Clark as Special Master); Virginia v. Maryland, 355
U.S. 946, 946 (1958) (appointing retired Justice Reed as Special Master); Wis-
consin v. Illinois, 271 U.S. 650, 650 (1926) (appointing former Justice Hughes
as Special Master).
105. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 271 U.S. 650 (1926).
106. See Lino A. Graglia, Is Antitrust Obsolete?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 11, 13 (1999).
107. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxxiv-lxxxv
(3d ed. 1996).
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 98 n.132 (1976) (per curiam) (de-
scribing the Progressive Party's reintegration into the Republican Party at the
time of Hughes' nomination); Michael J. Goldberg, Law, Labor, and the Main-
stream Press: Labor Day Commentaries on Labor and Employment Law, 1882-
1935, 15 LAB. LAW. 93, 125 (1999) (noting Justice Hughes was the Republican
nominee for President against Woodrow Wilson).
109. See STONE ETAL., supra note 107, at lxxxv.
110. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930) (per curiam). During his
service as Special Master, Hughes authored a book on the role of the Supreme
Court in American history and politics. CHARLES EvANS HUGHES, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1-42 (1928).
111. See Virginia v. Maryland, 355 U.S. 946, 946 (1958).
112. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 414 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1973).
113. Telephone Interview with Francis J. Lorson, supra note 98.
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tion to the rapidly expanding federal caseload. 114 This shift
away from the appointment of senior and retired judges might
also have had the incidental effect of preserving consistency
within individual cases, given that a number of senior or re-
tired judges appointed as Special Masters died during the
course of their service as Special Master, requiring appoint-
ment of new Special Masters in what usually were lengthy and
complex litigations.115 Consider, for example, that one of the
oldest cases in the Court's original docket is also one of its most
current: Arizona v. California,116 an original jurisdiction suit
filed in the Court in 1930 and refiled in 1953 after being dis-
missed without prejudice.117 Since first instituted, five Special
Masters have been appointed, two appointments owing to the
death of the Masters' respective predecessors.118
The presence of repeat players in the role of Special Master
may indicate that the Court selects from a short-list reper-
toire.119 While some appointments appear to result from a Jus-
tice's personal familiarity with the person appointed, particu-
larly among non-judges appointed, the reappearance of the
same Special Masters in different original jurisdiction cases
likely is attributable to the fact that certain original jurisdic-
tion cases coincide or bear a strong resemblance to one another,
either factually or legally.1 20 In appointing non-judges, an in-
creasing trend over the past two decades has been to appoint
deans or professors at nationally recognized law schools,121 pos-
sibly because many Special Masters in this category performed
114. See id.
115. See Appendix.
116. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). This case has a tormented history. While ini-
tially instituted by Arizona against California over rights to and apportion-
ment of the Colorado River, time has brought the two states to the same side
of the litigation as against the United States and various Native American
tribes, with many of the adjacent states joined as intervenors. See Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1983).
117. See Arizona v. California, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (per curiam); Arizona v.
California, 283 U.S. 423, 449, 464 (1931) (per curiam).
118. See Appendix infra at 704-15; see, e.g., Arizona v. California, 350 U.S.
812 (1955) (appointing Simon H. Riflind Special Master to replace the de-
ceased Justice George I. Haight).
119. See Appendix (showing, among other repeat appointments, that
McKusick was appointed three times; Jasen, two times; Van Pelt, six times;
Breitenstein, two times; and Maris, six times).
120. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 441 U.S. 921 (1979) (appointing Albert
B. Maris as Special Master); Michigan v. Illinois, 441 U.S. 921 (1979) (same);
New York v. Illinois, 441 U.S. 921 (1979) (same).
121. See Appendix, infra, at 704-15.
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government service, were familiar to the Court as advocates, or
had demonstrated specialized expertise with respect to the is-
sues central to the dispute.
One of the primary areas in which the Court has appointed
non-judges having specific substantive expertise is in cases in-
volving disputes over water appointment and diversion. Arthur
Littleworth, a respected California lawyer with developed ex-
pertise in water rights,122 was appointed to preside over a cen-
tury-old dispute between Kansas and Colorado over apportion-
ment and diversion of the Arkansas River, which was resolved
by the Court, at least for the time being, just last year.123 An-
other well-qualified water rights scholar, Jerome C. Muys, was
appointed in Oklahoma v. New Mexico to serve as Special Mas-
ter in a water apportionment dispute in the western states.124
Muys has been described as "perhaps the most authoritative
author on the subject of compacts" to resolve water rights dis-
putes.125 Muys had experience with original jurisdiction cases,
too, having acted as one of the deputy attorneys general repre-
senting the defendant states in the 1960s in the original juris-
diction case of Arizona v. California.126 Owen Olpin, another
private practitioner, applied his knowledge of water rights in
the case of Nebraska v. Wyoming (Nebraska II).127 Even one of
the appointed judges assigned as Special Master, Jean Sala
Britenstein, had substantial water rights experience that aided
him in his Special Master tasks. During the 1920s, Britenstein
assisted in drafting Colorado's water rights statutes and was
later identified as "the preeminent authority on water law in
the entire West."128 One of the few, if not the only, subject-area
122. See Arthur L. Littleworth, The Public Trust vs. The Public Interest, 19
PAC. L.J. 1201, 1201 n.* (1988); see also Robert T. Stephan, Water Rights to
the Arkansas River: The Status of Kansas v. Colorado, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 65, 66 (1994). In 1995, Littleworth coauthored a book about California
water law. ARTHUR L. LITILEwORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER
(1995).
123. See Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S. Ct. 2023 (2001); see also Kansas v.
Colorado, 484 U.S. 910 (1987).
124. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 484 U.S. 1023 (1988).
125. E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples from the Truckee: The Case for Congres-
sional Apportionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 145, 162 (1995). Muys has authored studies and scholarship on interstate
compacts. See JEROME C. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTs 323 (1971).
126. Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966).
127. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1993).
128. 832 F.2d LXXIX, LXXIX; see also 732 F.2d CIX-CXX (transcribing the
convening of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in honor of Judge Breiten-
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specialists appointed as Special Master in a case unrelated to
water rights was Professor John A. Carver. Carver, former As-
sistant Secretary of the Interior, was appointed Special Master
in a state boundary dispute, Texas v. Oklahoma.129
A surprising number of Special Masters, particularly of the
non-judge Masters, had close personal or professional ties ei-
ther to the Court's Justices (current or former) or to other Spe-
cial Masters in prior cases, suggesting that Special Masters, at
least occasionally, are plucked from a short list of the Court's
intimate associates. The relationship both between Special
Masters and Justices and between Special Masters and other
Special Masters deserves mention as it suggests that Special
Master appointments likely evolve as much from personal
communications as from democratic processes. 130 Even for
those Special Masters not intimately connected with the Court,
the majority of non-judges appointed as Special Masters in the
last few decades have argued cases before the Supreme
Court,13 ' making their faces at least familiar to the Justices.
Among the Special Masters having close ties to the Court
were Harvard Professor Samuel Williston, constitutional histo-
rian Charles Warren, Judge Walter Armstrong, and attorney
Monte Lemann. Professor Williston, the Special Master to pre-
side over a dispute between Missouri and Iowa,132 was a well-
known contracts law expert responsible for drafting the Uni-
form Sales Act, 133 serving as reporter on the Restatement of
Contracts, 134 and authoring a leading treatise on contract
law. 135 Williston had an inside track to the Court, having been
a revered professor to and colleague of future Justice Felix
stein).
129. Texas v. Oklahoma, 448 U.S. 905 (1980).
130. This is not to suggest that the Special Masters are not qualified or es-
teemed lawyers or that they are undeserving beneficiaries of their associations
with the Justices. The fact that many are close colleagues of the Justices, who
hold highly reputable positions within the legal system, serves implicitly to
credit their many accomplishments.
131. See Appendix.
132. Missouri v. Iowa, 304 U.S. 549 (1938).
133. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 221-22
(1940)).
134. See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J.
493, 499 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
135. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1990); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
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Frankfurter, 36 who was appointed to the Court one year after
Williston's appointment as Special Master, 137 and having
clerked in October Term 1888 for Justice Horace Gray, the first
Supreme Court justice to hire law clerks. 138
Charles Warren, appointed to the Special Master post
twice in the 1920s, had co-authored the instrumental law re-
view article Right to Privacy in 1890 with Justice Brandeis. 139
Warren was a rising legal historian at the time of his appoint-
ments who eventually authored a preeminent two-volume text
on the history of Supreme Court,140 which won the Pulitzer
Prize, 141 and historical articles and texts on the drafting of the
Constitution, 142 the federal judiciary, 143 the American bar and
legal profession, 1' and bankruptcy. 145 During World War I,
136. See Felix Frankfurter, In Memoriam: Samuel Williston: An Inade-
quate Tribute to a Beloved Teacher, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1963).
137. Frankfurter taught on the Harvard Law faculty with Williston when
Williston was appointed Special Master in 1938. Frankfurter was appointed
to the Supreme Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939. See STONE,
supra note 107, at lxxxii.
138. See Richard W. Painter, Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430,
1453 n.84 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST
EYEWITNESs ACCOUNT OF THE EPIc STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1998)).
139. In the famed case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, supported the Court's result
abolishing federal common law with reference to Warren's published examina-
tion of a previously unknown draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789, citing War-
ren's work as the "recent research of a competent scholar." Id. at 72-73 & n.5.
See also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Com-
mon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 389-90 (1964) (discussing Warren's influence
on the Erie outcome); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to His-
torical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 389 (1998)
(same); Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision
Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 356 & n.4
(1977) (same); Glenn M. Willard, Courts of General Jurisdiction: Judicial
Power Extending to Cases Arising Under the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God," 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1996) (same).
140. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1926).
141. Martin Shapiro, The Charles River Bridge Case, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 75
(1999).
142. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928).
143. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); Charles Warren, Federal and State Court
Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (1930).
144. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911);
CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA (1908).
145. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
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Warren became an Assistant Attorney General, a position that
brought him before the Court.1 46
Other Special Masters had ties to the Justices through
their participation in professional organizations. Retired Judge
Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., Special Master in Mississippi v.
United States'47 and United States v. Louisiana,148 was ap-
pointed together with former Justice Charles E. Whittaker and
ten other prominent legal professionals to draft the first ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 149 Monte M.
Lemann, appointed as Special Master in the early twentieth
century cases of Arkansas v. Tennessee150 and Wisconsin v. Illi-
nois,1 51 was a respected Louisiana advocate who argued a series
of cases before the Court and was appointed by Chief Justice
Hughes in 1935 to the Advisory Committee charged with draft-
ing the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 52 As he was
nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lemann turned
down the appointment. 53
The biographies of several Special Masters also demon-
strate fraternization among many of the men appointed to the
role. Special Masters Simon Rifkind and Lloyd Garrison, for
example, were both name partners and colleagues in the New
York-based firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.
Rifkind had close association with another Special Master,
Charles Meyers.' 54 Rifkind chose Meyers as his assistant when
he was appointed as Special Master in 1955 in the case of Ari-
146. See, e.g., Lim v. United States, 246 U.S. 674, 674 (1918); Hamburg v.
United States, 246 U.S. 662, 662 (1918).
147. Mississippi v. United States, 487 U.S. 1215, 1215 (1988).
148. United States v. Louisiana, 395 U.S. 901, 901 (1969).
149. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY (1980) (naming the
members of the original committee).
150. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 564 (1940); Arkansas v. Tennes-
see, 301 U.S. 666, 666 (1937).
151. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 313 U.S. 547, 547 (1941); Wisconsin v. Illinois,
311 U.S. 107, 107 (1940); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 309 U.S. 569, 571 (1940) (per
curiam).
152. See Felix Frankfurter, A Legal Triptych, 74 HARV. L. REV. 433, 445-47
(1961) (providing a brief biography of Lemann as a professor, advocate, foun-
der of Louisiana's first legal aid society, and as a member of the Advisory
Committee); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Ap-
peals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 490 n.110 (1998).
153. See Frankfurter, supra note 152, at 447.
154. Simon H. Rifkind, Charles J. Meyers, 34 STAN. L. REV. vi, vi (1981).
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zona v. California.155 Meyers went on to be appointed Special
Master twice in the 1980s, presiding over the cases of Louisi-
ana v. MississippiI56 and Texas v. New Mexico.
157
While the ranks of Special Masters appear to consist
largely of Caucasian males, 158 at least one minority, Wade
McCree, Jr., has served as Special Master.159 McCree, an Afri-
can-American, was appointed Special Master in three of the
Court's original jurisdiction cases in the 1980s. 160 At the time
of his first appointment, he had served as a trial judge in the
Michigan state court system and as a federal judge at both the
district court level and the appellate level-he was Michigan's
first elected black judge and the first black to be appointed to
the federal bench in Michigan. 161 McCree also acted as Solici-
tor General during the Carter Administration, after which he
left to join the faculty at the University of Michigan Law
School.1 62
These brief portraits hardly do justice to the illustrious ca-
reers of many-if not all-of the Special Masters appointed to
the Court. They do, however, demonstrate the varied skills and
areas of expertise that various Masters have brought to the role
and indicate that many of the Masters, even if lacking in judi-
cial experience, were skilled in the law. In addition, for the
155. Arizona v. California, 350 U.S. 812, 812 (1955).
156. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 454 U.S. 937, 937 (1986).
157. Texas v. New Mexico, 468 U.S. 1202, 1202 (1984).
158. Seltman, supra note 13, at 8.
159. Another Special Master, Walter A. Huxman, while not a minority,
participated in the appellate court predecessor to the monumental Brown v.
Board of Education, which influenced the future path for minorities in this
country. As a federal circuit judge, Huxman sat on a three-member district
court panel and authored the lower court opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), which was overruled by the Court in its
famous 1954 decision. The decision haunted Huxman, but he felt bound to the
rule of law established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). See
Brown v. Board of Education, 892 F.2d 851, 895 (10th Cir. 1989) (Baldock, J.,
dissenting); see also In Memoriam: Walter A Huxman, 474 F.2d preface at 14
(statement by Hon. Robert H. Kaul) (noting that Huxman "was torn between
his own philosophical beliefs and judicial responsibility dictated by the rules of
stare decisis").
160. See Kansas v. Colorado, 478 U.S. 1018, 1018 (1986); New Jersey v.
Nevada, 474 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1986); California v. Texas, 459 U.S. 963, 963
(1982).
161. See William Clifford, Fast Lane for Lawyers: Black Lawyers in the
Auto Industry, 13 NBA NAT'L B. ASSN MAG. 19, 20 (1999); see also Brian C.
Kalt, Wade H. McCree, Jr., and the Office of the Soliciter General, 1977-1981,
1998 DETROIT C.L. AT MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 708.
162. See Kalt, supra note 161, at 704-08.
SPECIAL MASTERS
non-judges appointed to the role, the close associations between
the Masters and the Court suggest that the Court selects Spe-
cial Masters from the crowd of associates who have gained the
Court's confidence.
C. THE MASTER PROCEEDINGS
The appointment of a Special Master may be initiated ei-
ther on motion, which the Court may refuse to grant, 163 or at
the Court's own prerogative. After appointing a Special Mas-
ter, the Court provides little supervision of the master's pro-
ceedings. Even as a preliminary matter, no rule governing Su-
preme Court practice expressly provides for the appointment of
Special Masters, as contrasted with the appointment mecha-
nism for special masters in the lower federal courts set forth in
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 164
Prior to 1954, procedures for original cases were conducted
and defined on an ad hoc basis, with counsel relying upon di-
rection from the Court. 165 Under current practice, two sources
direct the Special Master in the discharge of his duties: Rule 17
of the Supreme Court Rules, 166 a one-page delineation of rules
governing original actions, and the boilerplate language used in
the appointment memorandum. 167 Rule 17 provides that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the form of pleadings
and motions. 168 With regard to proceedings before the Master,
however, no authoritative mandate directs that the Federal
Rules of Evidence govern, though they are to be taken as
guides.' 69 This flexibility allows the Special Master to craft the
proceedings and to define the scope of discovery in a manner
unlike the rules that govern litigation in the lower federal
courts. For example, in addition to presiding over the direct
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the Master
may himself direct witnesses and call his own witnesses, 170 a
163. Compare Maryland v. Louisiana, 445 U.S. 913, 913 (1980) (motion
granted), with New Jersey v. New York, 50 S. Ct. 84, 85 (1929) (motion de-
nied).
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
165. See STERN ETAL., supra note 31, at 486.
166. See SUP. CT. R. 17.
167. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
168. SUP. CT. R. 17(2).
169. See id. The remainder of Rule 17 is devoted to setting forth the re-
quirements for filing an initial pleading, serving the opposing party, and other
specifications relating to process. See SUP. CT. R. 17.
170. See Joint Abstract of Record (Vol. 1, Testimony) at 11-12, Wisconsin v.
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practice in tension with the adversarial process generally hon-
ored in the federal courts.
In its appointment memoranda, the Court often directs the
Master to receive evidence, make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, and draft a proposed decree. 171 In so providing,
the Court grants the Master the authority "to summon wit-
nesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be in-
troduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for."172
Since 1965, the scope of the Master's control has extended to
the "authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of ad-
ditional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings."173 On
some occasions, however, the Court has instructed specially
that the Master receive and report evidence, but without con-
clusions of law or findings of fact, 174 or report findings of fact
without advancing any conclusions of law. 175
The precedent that guides the Special Master, particularly
in boundary dispute cases, is a fragile body of specialized fed-
eral common law, pasted together from international law trea-
tises, property concepts, contract law, and sovereignty princi-
ples. 176 In his book discussing the role of the Supreme Court, 177
Justice Jackson noted that "[tihe Court has no escape in many
cases of this character from the undesirable alternatives of re-
fusing to obey its duty to decide the case or of devising some
rule of decision which has no precedent or positive law author-
Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1940).
171. See Vermont v. New Hampshire, 282 U.S. 796, 796 (1930).
172. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 513 U.S. 924, 924 (1994); Louisiana
v. Mississippi, 510 U.S. 1174, 1174-75 (1994); Connecticut v. New Hampshire,
503 U.S. 1002, 1002 (1992); Arizona v. California, 498 U.S. 964, 964 (1990);
Washington v. Oregon, 288 U.S. 592, 593 (1933).
173. Nebraska v. Iowa, 379 U.S. 996, 996 (1965); accord Louisiana v. Mis-
sissippi, 510 U.S. 1174, 1174 (1994); Connecticut v. New Hampshire, 503 U.S.
1002, 1002 (1992); Arizona v. California, 498 U.S. 964, 964 (1990).
174. Georgia v. South Carolina, 253 U.S. 477, 478 (1920); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 252 U.S. 563, 564 (1920).
175. See Vermont v. New Hampshire, 46 S. Ct. 16, 16 (1925) (naming com-
missioners "for taking of testimony and documentary evidence"); New Mexico
v. Texas, 266 U.S. 586, 586-87 (1924) (directing Special Master to "make spe-
cial findings on all material questions of fact").
176. The Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins abolition of federal common law in
diversity jurisdiction cases does not affect the "specialized" common law that
has developed to treat the distinctly federal cases between states, where
application of state law principles of sovereignty over the other potentially
creates deep conflict. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 314.
177. JACKSON, supra note 80.
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ity."178 For example, Jackson observed that Justice Cardozo, in
formulating an opinion in New Jersey v. Delaware,179 turned to
ancient law, international law, and American and foreign con-
ventional authorities-and found them all lacking. 80
In the exercise of their duties, Special Masters today enter-
tain motions to intervene,' 8 ' motions for leave to file a counter-
claim, 8 2 and other motions that have been explicitly referred to
Special Masters by the Court. Trials in original jurisdiction
cases, if held, are presided over by the Special Master, 8 3 and a
summary of the proceedings is relayed in the report. In 1794,
the Court did impanel a jury before it, but the Court has only
done so again twice during the last two centuries. 8 4 The
Court's distance from the process of trial was best exemplified
in Arizona v. California, where the trial was presided over by
Simon Rifkind in the federal courthouse in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, far from the Justices.185
Once the Special Master's report is transmitted to the
Court, the Court exercises its authority in reviewing the report
and revising or approving the Master's' findings, conclusions, or
recommendations in whole or in part.186 Practice and time
have shown that the Court generally adopts the Special Mas-
ters' reports, even when those reports make conclusions of law
178. Id. at 73.
179. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 513 U.S. 803 (1994).
182. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Mississippi, 458 U.S. 1122, 1122 (1982).
183. See, e.g., Special Master Report, supra note 7, at 14 n.16 (stating that
a trial was presided over by Special Master in the West Conference Room of
the United States Supreme Court); Report by Special Master Simon H.
Rifkind, Arizona v. California, No. 8, Orig. (Dec. 5, 1960) (reporting that a
Special Master presided over a trial held at the United States Courthouse in
San Francisco, California).
184. Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 296 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (noting that a jury was impaneled in the case of Georgia v. Brailsford,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), though the practice was soon discontinued); 1
HAMPTON L. CARSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 169
n.1 (1902); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 299 & n.1.
185. See Report by Special Master Simon H. Rifkind, Arizona v. Califoria,
No. 8, Orig. at 3 (Dec. 5, 1960); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
186. See Washington v. Oregon, 288 U.S. 592 (1933) ("The findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the Master shall be subject to consideration,
revision, or approval by the Court."); Vermont v. New Hampshire, 282 U.S.
796, 796 (1930) ("The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Spe-
cial Master shall be subject to consideration, revision, or approval by the
Court.").
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in addition to resolving issues of fact. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has articulated a need for the Court to examine independently
the evidence. 187 Rehnquist admits, however, that the Court's
deference to the Special Master is necessary because the task of
fact-finding in original jurisdiction is too consuming for the
Justices, who are simultaneously charged with the responsibil-
ity of disposing of cases arising under its appellate jurisdiction,
a task that would be impeded substantially by fact-finding in
complex original jurisdiction cases. 188 Believing that the Court
cannot successfully juggle the responsibilities of its appellate
docket and its original docket, Rehnquist would commit many,
if not all, original jurisdiction cases to the district courts
through the establishment of concurrent original jurisdiction. 189
The delegation of trial tasks to a Special Master, followed
by review by the Supreme Court, allows the Court to operate
facilely in the manner in which it is most accustomed-that of
an appellate court scrutinizing the facts and conclusions of an
inferior actor or body. That the Court defers to the Master in
setting the stage for the proceedings is evident from other or-
ders directed to the Master from the Court, including that the
Master "may in his discretion" receive an amicus curiae brief
filed in the Court with his permission. 190 Further, while the
Special Master's reports and recommendations are advisory
only, the Court usually enters the Master's recommendation as
its order if neither of the state parties file a formal objection. 191
If the Court adopts the recommendations of the Special Master,
it may invite him to draft and submit a decree implementing
his recommendations 192 if a proposed decree has not been ap-
pended to the report.
The Master's costs and expenses, including those of his
187. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 762-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that 'justice is far better served by trials in the lower
courts, with appropriate review, than by trials before a Special Master whose
rulings this Court simply cannot consider with the care and attention it
should").
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See New Mexico v. Texas, 267 U.S. 583, 583 (1925).
191. See STERN ETAL., supra note 31, at 495 (stating that if "no exceptions
are filed, the Court normally will enter the decree recommended by the Mas-
ter").
192. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Arkansas, 454 U.S. 809, 809 (1981) ("Report
and Recommendations of the Special Master adopted. The Special Master is
invited to prepare and submit a proposed decree.").
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support staff, are borne equally by the state parties to the dis-
pute, unless the Court provides that they shall be otherwise
apportioned. 193 When the Special Master is a federal judge, his
salary is usually covered by the judicial payroll. 194 As the
Court increasingly supplants federal judges with private prac-
titioners in the role of Special Master, the costs of the dispute
can rise significantly; this fact has not escaped some justices,
such as former Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and former Justice Blackmun, each of whom has voiced vocifer-
ous dissents to the award of fees at the conclusion of litiga-
tion. 195
The size of the Special Master compensation awards in
many instances runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars
for private practitioners, raising the question of whether the
cost of a Special Master would ever impede a state's ability to
bring suit. The respective costs of original jurisdiction suits
where a federal judge is appointed as contrasted with cases in
which a private practitioner is appointed196 also raises the
193. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 530 U.S. 1259, 1259 (2000) (ordering
the Special Master's compensation and reimbursement to be paid "as follows:
40% by Nebraska, 40% by Wyoming, 3% by Colorado, 12% by the United
States, and 5% by Basin Electric Power Cooperative"); see also Kansas v. Ne-
braska, 528 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1999); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 510 U.S. 1174,
1174 (1994); Connecticut v. New Hampshire, 503 U.S. 1002, 1002 (1992) (stat-
ing that expenses "shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in
such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct"); Vermont v. New Hamp-
shire, 300 U.S. 636, 637 (1937) (stating that costs would be shared equally by
the two parties); Washington v. Oregon, 288 U.S. 592, 592 (1933).
194. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 645, 645 (1942) (noting that
"[iun view of the fact that the Master is a retired judge, the Court accepts his
offer to serve without compensation, but he shall be allowed his actual ex-
penses"); see also STERN ET AL., supra note 31, at 496 (stating that "for a num-
ber of years the Court usually appointed retired federal judges as Masters.
Since their salaries continued, they received only disbursements, saving the
parties substantial sums").
195. See Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 953, 953-56 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Special Masters from "establishment' law firms are
doing themselves and the public a disservice by asserting fees of this magni-
tude so persistently over dissents from the Court"); Texas v. New Mexico, 475
U.S. 1004, 1004-05 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and
Rehnquist, JJ.) (finding hourly rates for 'junior associates, some of whom were
only 'summer law clerks,' were not supported and were unreasonable"); Lou-
isiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 921, 921-23 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(finding fees excessive and noting "the public service aspect of the appoint-
ment is a factor that is not to be wholly ignored in determining the reason-
ableness of fees charged in a case like this").
196. See Frank J. Murray, Ex-Judges Prove Masters of Long-Term Billing,
WASH. TIAIES, Feb. 5, 1995, at A4 (noting that judges prior to the era of Chief
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question of which sovereignty-federal or state-should bear
the costs of inter-state disputes. By appointing Special Masters
who are judges on the federal payroll, the federal government
bears a large portion of the expense of the suit. Where private
practitioners are appointed, the expenses instead are funneled
directly to the states, and only the Court's minor intervention
and oversight is covered by the federal budget.
III. THE MASTER AT WORK NEW JERSEY V. NEW YORK
By reviewing the report of the Special Master presiding
over the Ellis Island dispute in the mid to late 1990s, one can
better appreciate the scope of the Special Master's role and the
depth of his involvement. The report handed to the Court by
the Special Master, Paul Verkuil,197 numbered fewer than two
hundred pages, but summarized a trial record comprised of
more than four thousand pages of testimony and almost two
thousand documents. 198 The report provides a good case study
because it is the first and only Special Master report available
on a public legal service. 199 The report may be particularly en-
gaging to the public at large and the generalist lawyer because
it meshes basic contract interpretation with well-known his-
toric events in our nation's history, unlike reports in other
cases that involve highly specialized topics.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE ELLIS ISLAND DISPUTE
New Jersey instituted the original action in the Supreme
Court in 1993, seeking sovereignty rights to the portions of
Ellis Island that were built up by the United States during the
United States's primary era of immigration in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.2°° While a compact en-
Justice Burger were given only reimbursement for expenses, but that one re-
cent case allowed a Special Master to bill $1.28 million in fees and expenses).
197. In the same year as his appointment as Special Master, Verkuil was
named Dean of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University
in New York City. Verkuil has extensive experience in academia, having
served as Dean at Tulane University and as Professor and President at The
College of William & Mary. See Appendix, infra at 705; ASS'N OF AM. LAW
SCH., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1997-98, at 983 (1997).
198. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at tbl. of contents (showing the
final report was 167 pages); see New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 821 n.8
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying the length of trial record).
199. See generally Special Master Report, supra note 7.
200. Id. at *1-5. Ellis Island stands 1300 feet from Jersey City, New Jer-
sey, and one mile from Manhattan in New York City, New York. New Jersey
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tered into by New Jersey and New York in 1834 specified the
rights of both states to Ellis Island, New Jersey sought delinea-
tion of a new boundary to cover those portions of the island that
had been extended outward from the island's natural bounda-
ries since the time of the compact. After the land-filled por-
tions had been added by the federal government, Ellis Island
measured more than nine times its size at the time of the com-
pact.201
Acrimony between New York and New Jersey regarding
Ellis Island rights long predated the initiation of the suit.20 2 As
the Master noted in his report, the boundary dispute dated
back between 170 and 300 years: 'Metaphorically, one could
even place the beginning of the controversy almost four hun-
dred years ago, when Henry Hudson... noticed the 'soft ozie
[sic] ground' of several small islands while sailing into what
would become New York Harbor. 20 3 New Jersey initiated the
first boundary dispute with New York in 1829, a suit in which
New Jersey conceded that New York had obtained jurisdiction
over Ellis Island, Staten Island, and neighboring islands by ad-
verse possession.2°4 The suit served as the catalyst for the
Compact of 1834, which defined the boundary at the island's
protrusion from the water.20 5 The Compact of 1834 provided for
New York's "present jurisdiction" over Ellis Island, but gave
New Jersey jurisdiction over the surrounding waters, including
the submerged lands.20 6
Even prior to its entry into the Compact of 1834, New York
granted jurisdiction over Ellis Island, strategically located on
the ocean harbor of one of the nation's economic centers, to the
v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 771 (1998).
201. See Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *1. New York conceded
that Ellis Island was roughly three acres in size at the time of the compact fix-
ing the boundary. Id. at *2; see also New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. at 770-
71.
202. See Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *3.
203. Id. at *16. The boundary dispute also implicates the Court's land-
mark decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), in which New
Jersey challenged New York's steamboat monopoly in the Hudson River and
the New York harbor. See id. at 7-8.
204. See In re Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U.S. 401, 406-07 (1883); New Jersey v.
New York, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 461, 467 (1830) (granting New Jersey's motion for a
subpoena to be served on the governor and the attorney general of New York,
thus allowing New Jersey's suit to proceed).
205. See Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *3-4.
206. See id. at *22.
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federal government to use for fortification purposes.2 7 New
York retained the right, however, to reclaim the property if the
federal government ceased to use it "for safety or defensive
purposes."208 Fort Gibson was erected on the island during the
War of 1812 to house prisoners and was later used during the
Civil War as a munitions arsenal for the Union army.20 9
Following the Civil War, the island stood vacant, until the
federal government transformed it for use as an immigration
station in the late 1880s. 2 10 Rapidly increasing immigration
throughout the 1880s led to federal regulation and control overimmigration, which had previously been left to the states.211
Despite the new use of the property by the federal govern-
ment, resulting from a transfer of the property from the United
States War Department to the Department of the Treasury,
New York never exercised its right to reversion. 212 Instead, in
1890 the federal government purchased New Jersey's rights
and title to the submerged lands surrounding the island, using
landfill to expand the size of Ellis Island.213 By 1934, the gov-
ernment had incrementally expanded the size of the land by
twenty-four and a half acres, compared to the island's original
three acres.214
The Ellis Island immigration station opened in 1892.215
207. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 772 (1998) (stating that New
York, by an 1808 deed, granted "right, title and interest" to the federal gov-
ernment "for the purpose of providing for the defense and safety of the city and
port of New-York" (citations omitted)).
208. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *4 (quoting 1808 N.Y. Laws
279).
209. Id. at *4, *71.
210. Id. at *4.
211. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. at 775.
212. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *4.
213. See id. New York's prior immigration station, located on the tip of
Manhattan, proved too small for the massive influx of immigrants and was
closed in 1890. The federal government subsequently purchased the rights
and title to an additional forty-eight acres of New Jersey territory surrounding
Ellis Island for $1000. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. at 776. This pur-
chase was necessary because the New York City Health Department an-
nounced, in 1902, that New York City's hospitals would no longer accept im-
migrants needing treatment for contagious diseases. Id. The federal
government was therefore required to expand the size of the small hospital
located on Ellis Island to provide sufficiently isolated wards. Id. Landfill was
added to create a "third island" off of Ellis Island to house the new hospital,
which was constructed in 1909 and opened in 1911. Id.
214. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *4.
215. Id. at *71.
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Immigration officials at Ellis Island were charged with enforc-
ing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Contract Labor Law
of 1885, and the Immigration Act of 1891.216 At Ellis Island,
which H.G. Wells after a 1906 visit to the island called a "filter
of immigrant humanity,'2 17 immigration officials used the im-
migration laws to weed out the "undesirables," including per-
sons with mental disabilities; persons with contagious diseases;
persons who had committed felonies, various misdemeanors, or
other acts of moral turpitude; illiterates; anarchists; and per-
sons having vision disorders, including cataracts.218 Immigra-
tion officials also had the authority to issue warrants for the
arrest and deportation of foreigners already residing in the
United States who were suspected, especially during World
War I and World War II, of being enemy aliens.219 Immigration
quotas enacted in 1924 were based on foreign representation
existing in the United States at the time of the 1890 census and
resulted in more favorable quotas for Western Europeans than
for Italians, Jews, and Eastern Europeans.220
The federal government's Immigration and Naturalization
Service closed the Ellis Island immigration station in the
1950s. 221 Between 1892, when the station opened, and its clo-
sure, the Ellis Island immigration station was the gateway for
millions of immigrants into the United States. 222 By 1954, how-
ever, the rate of immigration had slowed to approximately two
hundred persons per day, down from a peak of approximately
five thousand persons per day in 1907.22
After the station's closure, the property passed through the
hands of many federal governmental entities. These entities
held the property partly to avoid a clash between New Jersey
and New York; in the event title transferred to a private party,
both states would seek to collect taxes.224 In 1992, the Second
216. Barry Moreno, Foreward to PETER MORTON COAN, ELLIS ISLAND
INTERVIEWS: IN THEIR OWN WORDS xiii (1997).
217. ELLIS ISLAND: ECHOES FROM A NATION'S PAST preface (Susan Jonas
ed., 1989) (excerpting H.G. WELLS, THE FUTURE IN AMERICA: A SEARCH
AFTER REALITIES (1906)).
218. Moreno, supra note 216, at xiii-xv.
219. Id. at xiii.
220. Id. at xvi.
221. Id.
222. Paul Kinney, Chronology, in ELLIS ISLAND: ECHOES FROM A NATION'S
PAST, supra note 217, at 140-42.
223. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 777 (1998).
224. See id. at 777-78. The Secretary of the Interior in 1964 first suggested
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Circuit in Collins v. Promark Products, Inc. 2 25 ruled that New
York tort law governed injuries occurring on Ellis Island, in-
cluding those occurring on the land-filled portions of the island
built up from submerged lands transferred to the federal gov-
ernment by New Jersey. Perhaps fearing that its rightful sov-
ereignty was being judicially threatened, New Jersey initiated
the action in the Supreme Court fewer than two years later.
B. THE SPECIAL MASTER'S ROLE IN NEW JERSEY V. NEWYORK
The Master in New Jersey v. New York 226 defined his role
in relation to the Court as one where he acted in two capacities:
as the equivalent to a court of law and as a master of chan-
cery.227 The Master proposed a recommendation that trans-
gressed from strict application of rules of law to include princi-
ples of equity.228
The Master was sensitive to the fact that the delineation of
the boundary would have an expansive impact.229 While the in-
terests of defining a boundary located in a body of water might
be fewer than those for inhabited land space, both have strong
implications. The Master noted that the sovereignty rights
sought by New Jersey were those affecting "taxation, zoning,
environmental protection, elections, education, residency, in-
surance, building codes, historic preservation, labor and public
welfare laws, civil and criminal law, and... all other purposes
related to the jurisdiction of any state."230 Concessions on Ellis
Island alone generate almost $400,000 a year in state sales tax
revenue.231 The Master additionally declared that original ju-
risdiction cases often compel "full and liberal factual develop-
ment... because of the lofty historical, territorial, and finan-
that Ellis Island be designated and developed as a national historic site, in
part to reduce conflict between New Jersey and New York. Id. The National
Park Service was given jurisdiction over the island and began restoration in
1976. Id. at 778.
225. 956 F.2d 383, 384 (2d Cir. 1992).
226. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998).
227. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *16, *75.
228. See id. at *75-76 (reviewing the equity principles present in relevant
cases and determining that the Special Master must "fashion a remedy that is
just, fair, and convenient to the parties and the public").
229. See id. passim.
230. Id. at *2.
231. Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Joint Custody Splitting Ellis Island is Best So-
lution in War Between States, Fact Finder Says, REC. N. N.J., Apr. 2, 1997, at
Ai.
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cial implications of these cases to the states involved. 2 32
The Master also considered New York's pleas that the
boundary preserve the historic and emotional significance of
Ellis Island, quoting New York's proposition that New Jersey
"has never suffused the hearts of every immigrant whose first,
precious step onto United States soil caused a tear to spill on
the card pinned to his or her lapel which read... destination
'New York."2 33 Although not giving this sentimental value
much credence, the Master nevertheless may have given it
some equitable weight.234
Among the motions the Master considered or decided, the
Master recommended, successfully, that the City of New York
not be permitted to intervene, although the City was permitted
to proceed as an amicus.235 In addition, the Master denied
cross motions for summary judgment,236 issued an order and
memorandum governing such pretrial issues as the examina-
tions of expert witnesses237 and objections to fact witnesses and
documents, 238 and denied New York's motion to amend its
pleading to raise the affirmative defense of laches, ruling that
the laches defense was inapplicable to cases arising under the
Court's original jurisdiction. 239 In many instances, the Master
had unilateral authority to rule on the motions, although the
Court had the "factual record" to determine the basis for his
rulings on review.240
The pre-trial conference and the trial in New Jersey v. New
York were both conducted at the Supreme Court.241 The pre-
trial conference and the twenty-three day trial were held in the
West Conference Room, where the testimony of twenty-one
witnesses was received together with volumes of presented evi-
dence.242 The Master sat without a jury,243 and the trial was
232. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *l.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at *8.
236. Id. at "11. Both motions were denied without prejudice to renew at
trial. Id.
237. Id. at*13.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at *12, *14 n.16.
242. See Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *12-14.
243. Id. at *15.
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open to the public.244 Despite the open trial in the Court, much
of the information gathered in the case was obtained through
nonpublic proceedings. In reporting on the dispute, a major
source of controversy in the New Jersey-New York area, na-
tional and local media confined themselves almost exclusively
to reiterating portions of the Master's report, the arguments be-
fore the Court, or the Court's opinion.245 The early proceedings
in the case received little coverage notwithstanding the exten-
sive coverage given to the overarching controversy.
On March 31, 1997, the Master submitted his report to the
Court. 2 4 6 The report was an accumulation of the history of Ellis
Island-going back to the early steamboat controversy and the
Compact of 1834, summaries of positions and evidence, applica-
tions of common law and compact analysis, and conclusions of
law apportioning the island between the two parties rather
than granting full sovereign rights to one party to the exclusion
of the other.247 Eleven appendices, mostly maps, and a pro-
posed decree were appended to the report.248
The Master concluded that New Jersey had sovereignty
over the submerged lands upon which the landfill was added to
erect land immediately above and upon submerged land, while
New York would maintain sovereignty over the original three-
acre portion of the island, consistent with the Compact of
1834.249 Initially, the Master placed a transparent overlay of
an 1857 Ellis Island map, the most accurate representation of
New York's Ellis Island jurisdiction in 1834, over a 1995 Ellis
Island map.250 The Master found that "[tihis 'template' ap-
proach introduces impracticalities and inconveniences" that
militated in favor of a different approach.251 For example, the
244. Telephone Interview with Francis J. Lorson, supra note 98.
245. See, e.g., Deborah Pines, New Jersey Wins Control of Ellis Island, New
York Loses Bid to Keep Sovereignty, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 1998, at 1; David E.
Rovella, A Supreme Court Trial: States Fight Historic Battle for Ellis Island,
Original Jurisdiction Invoked as New Jersey Seeks a Chunk of the Immigra-
tion Landmark, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at A10.
246. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *15.
247. See generally Special Master Report, supra note 7.
248. Id. at app.
249. Id. at *80-85. The Master held that New York could not establish
ownership by prescription because the federal government, not New York, had
held "almost continuous and uninterrupted ownership and control over Ellis
Island pre-dating the Compact." Id. at *6.
250. Id. at *83.
251. Id.
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"template approach" would place the boundary line directly and
disproportionately through many of the buildings comprising
the old immigration station, including the Main Building,
which now serves as a museum.252 The approach also would
landlock New York's territory, denying New York access to the
waters by which millions of visitors came to Ellis Island annu-
ally by ferries arriving from New York City.253 The Master
therefore determined that a just result required the application
of equitable principles and his obligation was "thus to recom-
mend a remedy to this Court that works as well as can be in
light of the reality of divided sovereignty. '*54
The Master's ultimate conclusion and recommendation was
to demarcate boundaries around buildings, rather than through
them, adopting an approach that "rejects the false objectivity of
the template approach and creates a workable boundary.'2 55
New York was granted jurisdiction over a portion of land pro-
viding access to the ferry landing at the water's edge and also
over the entire Main Building, or museum.256 The Master
noted that this result would preserve "the time-honored con-
nection between the Main Building-the immigration locus-on
the original Island and the City of New York."1257 New Jersey
was granted jurisdiction over the remainder of the island,
which included the Baggage and Dormitory Building, the Boat-
house, and the Railroad Ticket Office.2 58 The Master published
his report on March 31, 1997, recommending that the Court
adopt his delineation of the New Jersey-New York boundary as
a solution that was "technically skillful, politically wise and
thoroughly just."12 59 Two months later, the Master submitted a
supplemental report setting forth in metes and bounds the
boundary delineated in his prior report.260 The final and sup-
252. Id; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 231, at Al.
253. Special Master Report, supra note 7, at *82-84.
254. Id. at *84. The Master stated that the "literal status of divided sover-
eignty" would be created if he were to establish a boundary line fully consis-
tent with the application of the 'template' approach." Id. at *83. The Master
also considered that the Preservation Amici "questioned the practicability of
applying historic preservation laws to parts of historic buildings." Id. at *84.
255. Id. at *85.
256. Id. at *84-85.
257. Id. at *85.
258. Id. at 84-85.
259. Id. at *85 (quoting a letter from Charles Wyzanski Jr., Solicitor of La-
bor, to the Treasury Department (Oct. 6, 1934)).
260. Office of the Special Master, Supplement to the Final Report of the
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plemental reports were filed in the Court on June 17, 1997.261
When all was said and done, New Jersey and New York were
ordered to share equally the Master's expenses and compensa-
tion, which totalled $713,924.25 over four years. 262
C. THE COURT'S DECISION IN NEW JERSEY V. NEWYORK
Both New Jersey and New York filed exceptions, or objec-
tions, to the Master's report,263 which entitled them to review
by the Supreme Court. New Jersey challenged only the dimen-
sions of the original portion of the island. New York challenged
the Master's conclusions that it had not established greater
prescriptive right to the island, submitting extrinsic evidence
such as postal codes, marriage certificates, and registrations of
vital statistics.264 The Court allowed several different entities
to file briefs as amici curiae, including the Acting Solicitor Gen-
eral,26 5 the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the
United States, the New York Landmarks Conservancy, and the
New York Historical Society.266
The Court heard arguments from the parties and the Act-
ing Solicitor General with regard to the exceptions, then issued
its decision on the merits in May of 1998.267 The Court found
that the Master had appropriately applied principles of federal
common law developed by the Court for resolution of boundary
disputes, including those for submerged lands and controlling
water marks, interpretation of state compacts, and adverse
possession and discovery.26 8
The Court sustained only one exception to the report, that
regarding "a miniscule detail of [the boundary] line"269 on the
Special Master, New Jersey v. New York, No. 120, Orig. (May 30, 1997).
261. New Jersey v. New York, 520 U.S. 1273 (1997).
262. New Jersey v. New York, 527 U.S. 1002 (1999) (ordering New Jersey
and New York to share equally the Special Master's reimbursement expenses
and compensation totaling $29,096.50); New Jersey v. New York, 521 U.S.
1116 (1997) (same for $263,488.89); New Jersey v. New York, 519 U.S. 1038
(1996) (same for $255,157.62); New Jersey v. New York, 516 U.S. 1026 (1995)
(same for $81,649.50); New Jersey v. New York, 515 U.S. 1130 (1995) (same
for $84,531.74).
263. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 780 (1998).
264. See id. at 813.
265. New Jersey v. New York, 522 U.S. 910 (1997).
266. New Jersey v. New York, 521 U.S. 1149 (1997).
267. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. at 767.
268. See id. at 783-89.
269. Id. at 808.
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premise that the Court was without authority to fudge the line
for the convenience of the parties, on the theory of equitable
principles, where buildings would be left to stand across the
two states.270 The Court ruled that the boundary diversions,
while proper, were within the province of Congress or the
states-but not the Court-to amend.271
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in
the judgment, but wrote separately to establish more succinctly
that the law and the record revealed a contradiction to public
perception and historic sentiment:
Many of us have parents or grandparents who landed as immigrants
at "Ellis Island, New York." And when this case was argued, I as-
sumed that history would bear out that Ellis Island was part and par-
cel of New York. But that is not what the record has revealed....
[O]ne [cannot] expect the immigrants themselves to have taken a par-
ticular interest in state boundaries, for most would have thought not
in terms of "New York" or "New Jersey," but of a New World that of-
fered them opportunities denied them by the Old.
272
Justice Stevens in dissent yielded greater weight to the
historic value of Ellis Island during the immigration era, point-
ing to steamship tickets and certificates of arrival declaring
New York as the final destination of immigrants arriving
there.273 Combined with the birth and death records establish-
ing New York as the domicile, New York's provision of police
and fire protection, and numerous other pieces of evidence
showing an understanding that Ellis Island was New York, this
historic significance proved to Justice Stevens that New York
had a prescriptive right that supervened the sterile terms of
the compact.274 Justice Scalia authored a separate dissent,
writing that the clear, practical construction of the compact
would grant sovereignty to New York.275
The division of the Court with regard to the weight of evi-
dence, the interpretation and historic understanding of the
Compact of 1834, and the role of the federal common law dem-
onstrates the necessity of employing a fact-finder to accumu-
late, assemble, and summarize the massive volume of evidence
270. See id. at 807-12.
271. Id. at 812.
272. Id. at 812-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
273. See id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. See id. at 816-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority countered
that such evidence should not in any way be dispositive, as the New York Im-
migration District extended into northern New Jersey. See id. at 799 n.19.
275. See id. at 829-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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necessary to the resolution of this case. That great minds could
find different evidence controlling and reach separate conclu-
sions, however, might also counsel against placing such deci-
sions in the hands of a single actor, such as a Special Master.
IV. THE MASTER PREDICAMENT
The Special Masters' powerful role in original jurisdiction
cases is disquieting in many respects. Most fundamentally, the
role of Special Master is one that-with the Court's permis-
sion-runs afoul of many of the characteristics of our American
federal judicial system: adversarial testing, presentation of
witnesses by parties, multilayered review, decisionmaking by
constitutionally appointed judicial actors, and adherence to ju-
dicially created procedural safeguards. By presenting his own
witnesses, employing his own discretionary rules of procedure
and evidence, proposing conclusions of law, and acting under
the authority of a secret appointment process, the Special Mas-
ter lurks in the shadows of the judicial processes that Ameri-
cans have come to view as synonymous with fair adjudication.
Encompassed within this broad criticism are two indispen-
sable features forming the crux of the difficulty. First, Special
Masters pose a constitutional difficulty in that they act in a
fundamental judicial role both without the blessing of constitu-
tional appointment jointly granted by the executive and legisla-
tive branches and without safeguards conferred upon federal
judicial officers by Article III of the Constitution. While the
modern system of government permits some non-Article III ac-
tors (such as magistrates, administrative law judges, or district
court special masters) to perform judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions, those roles are fundamentally distinguishable from that
of the Court's Special Masters.
Second, the authority granted to Special Masters in the ab-
sence of either delineated rules or a vast body of precedent cre-
ates both practical and theoretical predicaments. While the
absence of precise rules governing original actions may prevent
injustice stemming from rigid formalism, greater oversight and
institutionalized procedures are necessary to ensure the integ-
rity of proceedings. Oversight and procedures are necessary
given both the absence of multilayered review and the over-
arching significance of the Special Master's determinations in
cases affecting states, whose interests might often outweigh
those of the more traditional party litigants (such as individual
litigants, corporate litigants, or even class-action litigants).
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Critics of such formalism might argue that the availability
of a forum for final judgment is the critical feature of our judi-
cial system, rather than adherence to open, adversarial proc-
esses and procedural safeguards. Thus, a final resolution
might mitigate the risk of a call to arms, which was a critical
concern of the Framers in boundary disputes, 276 because people
would accept the ruling as an unassailable, final judgment. A
final resolution that appears the result of an unjust process,
however, might be the functional equivalent of an absent fo-
rum, potentially spurring a risk of armed revolt. Consider,
however, that publicity of outcomes that result from processes
not in conformity with the public's notion of fair adjudication
thus can create as much danger of outcry as the absence of an
adjudicatory forum.277
Finality also prevents a litigant who has been hailed into
court from having to bear the shame, burden, or expense of re-
litigating issues. The appellate process in the bulk of cases acts
to ensure the integrity of the findings and the conclusions be-
fore the judgment becomes final. Where the avenues of review
are restricted, however, as in original jurisdiction cases, par-
ticular care should be taken to make sure that the findings and
conclusions have been properly obtained. This objective can be
reached with greater confidence when there is a record of ad-
herence to the adversarial processes and procedures applicable
in the lower federal courts.
Even members of the Court, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Frankfurter, have expressed their dis-
content with the Court as a forum in original jurisdiction and
the use of Special Masters in original jurisdiction litigation.
Justice Frankfurter was deeply critical of the Court's handling
of its original docket, expressing doubts that litigation was the
276. See Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon
of Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 96 (1998) (quoting Henry M. Hart,
Jr., coauthor of the renowned casebook on federal courts, for the proposition
that one governmental institution must have the final authority to decide sub-
stantive issues or else we would risk a "disintegrating resort to violence" (cita-
tion omitted)).
277. To counter this argument, consider the case of Rodney King. The
Rodney King case was a prosecution by the state of California against four law
enforcement officers. Nonetheless, the verdict of acquittal led to the eruption
of violent protest riots. Litigation that does not implicate state-against-state
concerns therefore also can be seen to cause revolt where civilians perceive "a
breakdown of the legal order." Thomas M. Riordan, Copping an Attitude: Rule
of Law Lessons from the Rodney King Incident, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 676
(1994).
2002] 669
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
appropriate route for resolving conflicting governmental inter-
ests:
[Tihere are practical limits to the efficacy of the adjudicatory process
in the adjustment of interstate controversies. The limitations of liti-
gation-its episodic character, its necessarily restricted scope of in-
quiry, its confined regard for considerations of policy, its dependence
on the contingencies of a particular record, and other circumscribing
factors--often denature and even mutilate the actualities of a prob-
lem and thereby render the litigious process unsuited for its solu-
tion.27
8
Like Frankfurter, Chief Justice Rehnquist has articulated
his concern for the appropriateness of the Court as the forum
for original jurisdiction disputes.27 9 In addition, Rehnquist de-
nounced the Court's practice of resolving original jurisdiction
cases "by empowering an individual to act in our stead."2 80 One
commentator has argued in this vein that original jurisdiction
cases are ill-suited for trial before the Court, even with the fa-
cilitation of a case by an appointed Special Master, because the
Court has been structured as a multi-judge appellate court.281
Subscribing to a strict constructionist view, the Court's ju-
risdiction over disputes between state opponents is likely here
to stay, the only remaining remnant of cases in the Original
Jurisdiction Clause's whittled-down form. Within the sphere of
the Court's original jurisdiction, the Special Master's role thus
must be examined as one fraught with tension, but not beyond
repair.
A. THE ARTICLE III DIFFICULTY
The delegation of judicial functions to Special Masters in
original jurisdiction cases can be examined appropriately in the
context of debates regarding the authority of judicial adjuncts,
or non-Article III actors.282 Like Special Masters, judicial ad-
juncts, such as magistrates and administrative law judges, also
perform judicial functions without the salary and life tenure
protections bestowed upon the Article III judiciary.
Article III of the Constitution, which defines and grants
the powers of the federal judiciary, entitles the Article III judi-
278. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).
279. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 762-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
280. Id.
281. See STERN ETAL., supra note 31, at 482.
282. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 437-41.
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ciary-but not judicial adjuncts-to life tenure and salary pro-
tection.283 These protections are bestowed only on federal judi-
cial officers who withstand the constitutional appointment
process. Article II provides that the President "shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court" as well as any judges
appointed to inferior federal courts, which the Constitution
permitted, but did not expressly establish.284 However, like
other judicial adjuncts, Special Masters are appointed by the
Court beyond the reach of the appointment provisions to which
federal judgeships must conform. There is no dispute that Spe-
cial Masters are not subject to the tenure and salary protec-
tions of the Article III judiciary: They serve at the will of the
court only for the duration of the suit over which they pre-
side,28 5 and their compensation is subject to approval and dimi-
nution by the Court.
Without injecting here the entire debate over the legiti-
macy of judicial adjuncts, to which an extensive body of schol-
arship has been exclusively devoted,286 a synopsis of the debate
283. See U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office."); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937) (arguing
that permanent tenure of Article III judges contributes to judicial independ-
ence and the preservation of courts "as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution
against legislative encroachments"); THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 512 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937) (remarking that the relation
between salary protection and judicial independence derives from the maxim
"a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will"); see gen-
erally REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 236 (illustrating the expansion of jurisdic-
tion in lower courts to reduce the Supreme Court's burden).
In some European nations, constitutional questions are committed to
resolution by specialized judicial tribunals exclusively responsible for deciding
constitutional questions. For a comparative analysis of institutionalized pro-
tections afforded to judges serving on the constitutional courts in other na-
tions, see MARK TUSHNET & VICKI C. JACKSON, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foundation Press 1999); Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Pol-
icy Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 247, 247-48 (2001);
see also Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40
EMORY L.J. 837, 840 (1991).
284. See U.S. CONST. art. IX, § 2. For a discussion of the interplay between
the appointment process and the protections designed to ensure the integrity
of judicial decisionmaking, see STONE, supra note 107, at 77-81.
285. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 466 U.S. 144, 146 (1984) ("The Special
Master appointed by the Court is discharged with the thanks of the Court.").
286. For a discussion on the origins and the rise of the administrative
state, including administrative law judges, see Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Ad-
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is nonetheless instructive. Critics of the increasing roles judi-
cial adjuncts play in the federal judicial system argue that the
lack of accountability of the judicial adjuncts to constituents
and to citizens, because they are not appointed through the ap-
pointment provisions of the Constitution or through the elec-
toral process, threatens the integrity of judicial proceedings. 287
Arguing that Article III was crafted carefully to institute a ju-
diciary that could preserve balances between the federal
branches and between the federal and state governments,
many scholars and commentators point to Article III to argue
that the Constitution contemplates that only judges who have
achieved their positions through delineated dual-branch ap-
pointment mechanisms be available to adjudicate federal cases
and controversies.
The use of persons without Article III life tenure and sal-
ary protections to adjudicate specified matters has been dis-
puted throughout our nation's history.288 Examples of such ad-
juncts have ranged from non-judges who resolved veterans'
benefits and customs duties by the authority of the First Con-
gress289 to the more modern administrative law judges who
ministrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions,
49 AnMIN. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1997); W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law
Judges, Judicial Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Cus-
todes?, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95, 95-109 (2000); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231
(1994); and Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the
21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
941, 958-61 (2000).
Gillette argues that the delegation of judicial functions to administra-
tive regimes was a product of the New Deal era. Gillette, supra 286, at 95-96.
Further, while the Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 433 (1934), and ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 537 (1935), first found this delegation of authority unconstitutional, from
the end of the New Deal "until 1995, the Supreme Court declined to strike
down any delegation of power." Gillette, supra, at 96.
287. See, e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037,
1053 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting).
288.
The protections of life tenure and an irreducible salary reserved for
the federal judiciary in article III safeguard two preeminent values
that might be threatened by a delegation of authority to magistrates
as class two adjuncts: (1) the maintenance of the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers, and more specifically, the protection of the inde-
pendent judiciary from influence by the other governmental branches;
and (2) a litigant's right to an independent federal judiciary.
Raymond P. Bolanos, Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire: A Threat To Funda-
mental Fairness?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 845 (1989).
289. See Craig A. Stern, What's a Constitution Among Friends?-
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preside over cases involving public rights.290
As the use of non-Article III actors exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has increased,291 the Court has inter-
vened to circumscribe their roles. In the landmark case of
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,292 the
Court held that an executive official could, without offending
Article III, permissibly audit a federal employee's accounts and
impose a summary attachment if the audit revealed a deficit.
The Court admitted that the actions of the executive official
"may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act," but noted that
the exercise of many governmental functions often will include
performing quasi-judicial acts: "In this sense the act of the
President in calling out the militia.., or of a commissioner
who makes a certificate for the extradition of a criminal, under
a treaty, is judicial.293
The Court's consideration of non-Article III judicial author-
ity expanded with the Depression-era case Crowell v. Benson.294
In Crowell, an employee injured in United States navigable wa-
ters filed a private suit seeking compensation under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.295 The
employee challenged the determination of his rights by a Dep-
uty Commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensa-
tion Commission, whose findings of fact, but not conclusions of
law, were final. 296 The Court held that committing findings of
fact to a non-Article III actor was permissible notwithstanding
that the Constitution expressly commits "admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction" to the federal courts.297
In reaching this holding, Crowell noted the important, yet
somewhat amorphous, distinction between cases of "public
right" and of "private right. 2 98 In cases of "public rights," in-
Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1998).
290. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
291. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional
Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEo. L.J. 2589, 2605
(1998) [hereinafter Resnik The Federal Courts and Congress] (citing HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 438; Federal Courts' Caseload Continues Up-
ward Spiral, 29 THIRD BRANCH 4, 6 (Mar. 1997)).
292. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
293. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
294. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
295. Id. at 36.
296. Id.
297. Id at 39-40, 45-46, 53.
298. Id. at 50.
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volving disputes "between the government and persons subject
to its authority" pursuant to a legislative or administrative
scheme, the findings of fact can be made in the first instance by
"legislative courts," or tribunals of administrative agencies. 299
So, too, in cases of "private right," involving liability of one in-
dividual to another under the law as defined,"3°° can non-judges
make findings of fact. The Court noted that "it is historic prac-
tice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent
of the parties, masters, and commissioners and assessors, to
pass upon certain classes of questions."30 1 The only exception
to this general premise would be suits brought to enforce con-
stitutional rights, where "the judicial power of the United
States" necessarily extends to the independent determination
of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the perform-
ance of that supreme function.30 2 Thus, Crowell placed the
Court's imprimatur on the practice of using non-Article III ac-
tors to make final determinations as to fact issues in many
suits, to the extent that the determinations are "supported by
evidence and within the scope of his authority."30 3
During the 1950s, the Court undertook review of a case in-
volving the proper scope of functions committed to a special
master in the district court.3°4 In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
the Court disapproved the use of a special master in a compli-
cated antitrust proceeding where the special master had been
assigned full fact-finding authority by the lower court.305 The
Court rejected the argument that such delegation to the special
master was necessary given the complicated nature of the anti-
trust issues and the congested court docket.306 The Court did
not, however, disapprove of the use of special masters in com-
plicated litigation, provided their authority was strictly con-
strained.30 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court resorted
solely to the authority granted to special masters through Rule
53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, without ever reach-
ing the Article III issue.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 51.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 60.
303. Id. at 46.
304. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
305. Id. at 257.
306. Id. at 259-60.
307. Id.
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Approximately twenty-five years later, the Court examined
the roles of two categories of judicial or quasi-judicial actors
granted new authority under two acts passed by Congress in
1978: magistrates and bankruptcy judges.30s The Court in
United States v. Raddatz approved the expanded use of magis-
trate judges to entertain certain pretrial motions, noting that
the magistrate judges' authority was circumscribed by the dis-
trict court, which referred the motions to the magistrate judges
and which controlled their appointment and removal. 30 9 The
district courts' authority over the magistrate judges in these
circumstances limited the threat of incursion by other
branches. 310
The Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., however, held that bankruptcy judges
unlawfully exercised authority that "carries the possibility
of... an unwarranted encroachment" into Article III power.311
Under the new Bankruptcy Act of 1978, bankruptcy judges,
who were considered "adjunct[s] to the district court," were
vested with "all of the powers of a court of equity, law and ad-
miralty," subject to few restrictions.3 12 The bankruptcy judges
could exercise this authority notwithstanding that they were
not entitled to Article III's tenure protections, serving instead
for 14-year appointments. 313 The Court found that there was
no justification for allowing a specialized tribunal or adjunct to
determine rights "when the right being adjudicated is not of
congressional creation."3 14 More specifically, the bankruptcy
judge was permitted to act as adjudicator not only over claims
arising under federal bankruptcy laws, but also over state law
claims, demonstrating "assignment of historically judicial func-
tions to a non-Art. III 'adjunct,' [whose authority] plainly must
be at a minimum."3 15 The Court further distinguished the
308. See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
309. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
310. Id. at 683 (stating that "although the statute permits the district court
to give to the magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendations" as
much weight as the district court, acting in its discretion finds appropriate,
"that the delegation does not violate Art. Im so long as the ultimate decision is
made by the district court").
311. 458 U.S. 50, 84(1982).
312. Id. at 95 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1481).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 84.
315. Id.
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bankruptcy judges from other adjuncts on the grounds that
their determinations were subject to a higher threshold "clearly
erroneous" standard of review on appeal and that they could is-
sue judgments that could be final, even in the absence of ap-
peal. 316 Thus, the Court concluded that "the 'adjunct' bank-
ruptcy courts... exercise jurisdiction behind the fagade of a
grant to the district courts and are exercising powers far
greater than those lodged in the adjuncts approved in either
Crowell or Raddatz."31 7
Raddatz and Northern Pipeline marked the beginning of a
wave of decisions scrutinizing the authority of non-Article III
actors performing judicial or quasi-judicial roles, marked most
notably by the Court's decisions in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor318 and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricul-
tural Products Co. 319 In Schor, the Court held that an agency,
to the extent granted by Congress, was permitted to adjudicate
related state law counterclaims.3 20 The Schor Court reasoned
that to require a bifurcated examination of the single dispute
"would be to emasculate if not destroy the purposes" behind the
act committing resolution of certain issues to the agency.32' Fi-
nally, in Thomas, the Court upheld the use of arbitrators to re-
solve certain compensation disputes between pesticide manu-
facturers under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. Although the arbitrators' decisions were sub-
ject to review only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit," Ar-
ticle III was not contravened because the disputes that were
required to be arbitrated arose under a complex administrative
scheme and therefore possessed "many of the characteristics of
a public rights dispute."32 2 Thus, Thomas partly weakened the
"public rights-private rights" distinction as a means of deter-
mining when a non-Article III actor could perform judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. To some, Thomas also demonstrated
the liberalization of the rule restricting functions that could be
performed by non-Article III judges, adding to the "case law
316. Id. at 85.
317. Id. at 85. (stating, with respect to Crowell, that "while the agency in
Crowell engaged in statutorily channeled fact-finding functions, the bank-
ruptcy courts [here] exercise 'all of the jurisdiction' conferred by the Act on the
district courts").
318. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
319. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
320. See generally 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
321. Id. at 844.
322. 473 U.S. at 569-70.
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and other judicial commentary by life-tenured judges [showing
that the Article III judiciary] approve[s] and encourage[s] con-
gress to expand the non-Article III judiciary, which now decides
a host of cases at both the trial and appellate levels." 323
The Court has made the demarcation between permissible
delegation and impermissible delegation to non-Article III ac-
tors less than clear. But the result of the Court's decision in
this area is, as one commentator aptly put it, that
the delegation of essential judicial functions to personnel who are not
judges appointed under Article III, with life tenure and protected
salaries, violates the separation of powers doctrine and perhaps the
due process clause unless the benefits of such delegation-efficiency
and expertise-outweigh the diminution of Article II value-
neutrality, and adjudication.324
B. OTHER JUDICIAL "ADJUNCTS"
There are three principal judicial adjuncts to whom the
Court's Special Masters might be compared: administrative law
judges, magistrate judges, and federal district court special
masters. The role of the Court's Special Masters is distinct
enough from each of these actors to compel grave concerns, par-
ticularly in light of the paramount importance of states' rights
and the single layer of judicial review.
1. Administrative Law Judges
Beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, designated employees within regulatory agencies were
assigned to preside over hearings involving determination of an
individual's rights.325 As regulatory agencies grew in size and
authority, particularly as a result of New Deal programs im-
plemented in the 1930s, the duties of investigation, prosecu-
tion, and adjudication became increasingly unwieldy.326 Re-
323. Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and
Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 (1999) [hereinafter Resnik, Judicial
Independence] ("Both case law and other judicial commentary by life-tenured
judges approve and encourage Congress to expand the non-Article III judici-
ary, which now decides a host of cases at both the trial and appellate levels."
(citations omitted)); Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress, supra note 291,
at 2605.
324. Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 596 (1994).
325. See generally Gifford, supra note 286, at 4-10; Gillette, supra note 286,
at 958-62; Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive Departments and
Agencies, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 251-253 (1996).
326. See Gifford, supra note 286, at 6.
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sponding to concerns of institutional bias resulting from the
agency's primary involvement in these three stages of an adju-
dication, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) in 1946.327 The APA imposed procedural requirements
on agency hearings, including, most importantly, the require-
ment of an internal separation of powers between a tenured
administrative law judge (AUJ) and other agency officials. 328 In
addition, unlike magistrates and Special Masters in the district
courts, who have limited tenure, as discussed below, ALJs' ten-
ure is not restricted to set terms. 329
ALJs are seen as Article I adjudicators vested with author-
ity under the executive, rather than the judicial, branch. ALJs
decide matters affecting rights under regulatory schemes en-
acted by Congress, or "public rights," rather than matters af-
fecting private rights that stem from other sources of law, in-
cluding common law and the Constitution.330 More aptly, AUJs
"are the face of federal justice for countless litigants whose
problem lies with the federal government in some fashion."331
An ALJ's findings of non-constitutional issues and jurisdic-
tional issues can be final, absent error of constitutional propor-
tions, but conclusions of law are appealable to an agency com-
mission and ultimately to an Article III court.332 On Article III
review, a reviewing court may "hold unlawful and set aside" es-
sentially only those findings and conclusions found to be "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law, contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity," or granted without due process of
327. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
328. Id.
329. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success"
and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 279 (1990) (noting that an adminis-
trative law judge's tenure "is not formally 'life,' but then neither is that of arti-
cle III judges," who serve only during "good behavior").
330. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 387-444 (exploring
"Congressional Authority to Allocate Judicial Power to non-Article III Federal
Tribunals").
331. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L.
REV. 1755, 1765-66 (1997).
332. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 396 (quoting Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Ex-
ercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1375 (1953)); Wood, supra note 331,
at 1765 ("Social security cases, labor cases, immigration cases, railroad dis-
ability cases, and countless others begin before ALJs and often enter the Arti-
cle III system only at the court of appeals level.").
[Vol.86:625
SPECIAL MASTERS
law. 333
Some argue that one danger of the ALJs is that, as officers
of the executive branch, they are more prone or vulnerable to
political influences, from which Article III judges are often per-
ceived as being insulated.334 Certainly, ALJs outnumber mem-
bers of the Article III judiciary. As of the early to mid-1990s,
1100 ALJs were resolving approximately 350,000 adjudications
per year.335
Like ALJs, Supreme Court Special Masters are subject to
superintendence by Article III judges, but retain greater discre-
tion to decide certain motions and make findings of fact. ALJs
do have vast fact-finding authority in many circumstances, but
they are subject to considerable oversight. Considering that
Article III review is still possible, a case heard before an admin-
istrative law judge may be scrutinized on more levels of review
than a case filed in a federal district court in the first instance.
In addition, like district court special masters, ALJs usually
have developed expertise with regard to the issues they adjudi-
cate, particularly where their jurisdiction is closely circum-
scribed. Interestingly, like the Court's Special Masters, the
administrative judiciary, at least as of 1995, was overwhelm-
ingly comprised of non-minority males. 336
Supreme Court Special Masters, one might argue, may
only make proposed conclusions of law followed by recommen-
dations and proposed decrees, but this distinction is one of form
over substance. Given the deference of the Court to the Special
Master's findings and conclusions, his recommendations bear
substantially similar weight to entered-but appealable-
333. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courtsand
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2570 (1998) ("Ihat Article III
generally requires judicial review of federal agency decisions []is a qualified,
not a universal, rule. Beyond the fact that the required scope of review is not
plenary, the rule is subject to numerous exceptions," including immigration
matters.).
334. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE
L.J. 749, 794-95 & n.184 (1999); see also Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Prece-
dent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory
of the Second Best, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1994) ("In exercising power, ad-
ministrative agencies combine [executive, legislative, and judicial] powers that
the Constitution separates .... ").
335. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 392-93 (citing STRAUSS ET
AL., ADMINISTRATWVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 959 (9th ed. 1995)).
336. Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUm. L. REv. 1532, 1533 (1995) (stating
that 94.59% of ALJs were male and 94.32% were white).
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conclusions and orders. In original jurisdiction cases, the im-
pact of fact-finding error can be exaggerated by the lack of re-
view available to scrutinize findings, particularly those made
by a Master in a subject matter outside of his legal expertise.
The more important distinction between ALJs and the
Court's Special Masters is that original jurisdiction suits in the
Court entail private litigation, not disputes over "public rights."
Thus, following the lesson of Crowell and its progeny, the Court
should be reluctant to permit the delegation of authority over
quasi-judicial functions to a non-Article III actor. Moreover,
the issues involved in such litigation are bound to affect a
broad population, specifically the residents of the litigating
states. Such distinctions demonstrate the fallacy of pointing to
ALJ examples as a justifiable basis for the current Special Mas-
ter practice in the Court.
2. Magistrate Judges
Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act in 1968 to
provide federal courts with assistance in the exercise of their
administrative duties.337 Through this Act, magistrates, who
sit in federal courts but who are not Article III judicial actors,
are vested with the authority "to administer oaths and affirma-
tions," take "acknowledgements, affidavits, and depositions,"
sentence persons convicted of certain classes of misdemeanors,
and decide certain nondispositive pretrial issues. 338 Full-time
magistrate judges serve renewable eight-year terms, and part-
time magistrates serve renewable four-year terms.339 A magis-
trate judge may only be removed during his term for "incompe-
tency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental dis-
ability. 340
Congress in 1979 granted magistrates the authority to pre-
side over civil trials upon the consent of both parties.341 Dis-
trict courts may direct a magistrate to submit a report of pro-
posed findings and recommendations of law to the district court
337. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)-(3) (1994); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 35, at 437-41; Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office
of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS.
L. REV. 4, 111.1-10 (1999).
338. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1994).
339. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e).
340. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i).
341. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643.
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overseeing his functions. 342 An Article III court's review of a
magistrate's decision is de novo.343
The Court has been careful to circumscribe magistrate
functions that are not explicitly delineated in the Federal Mag-
istrate Act. While the Act provides that magistrates may exer-
cise "additional duties" not identified, 344 the Court in Gomez v.
United States345 stated that a magistrate who impaneled a jury,
conducted voir dire, and instructed the jury on various points of
law346 exceeded the scope of his authority as magistrate.347 The
Court reasoned that the criminal defendants were entitled to
have an Article III judge preside over critical stages in their
trial, which included those acts unlawfully carried out by the
magistrate. 348 In attempting to define those judicial acts out-
side the bounds of a magistrate's authority, the Court stated
that "Congress intended a magistrate to be a 'supernotary,' as-
suming only the district judge's 'irksome, ministerial tasks'...
[not a] 'para-judge.' 349
The role of the Supreme Court Special Master resembles
that of the magistrate officer in the federal district courts in
many respects. He can be called upon by the Court to collect
evidence and, in theory, is assigned primarily to assist with the
"ministerial" aspects of federal adjudication. However, the
342. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994) (A district court may "designate a mag-
istrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a
judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the dis-
position.").
343. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1994). Judge Posner argues that this statute
gives an almost complete set of Article III powers to hundreds of non-Article
III judges.
And it is not true that just because the latter are appointed by Article
III judges they are independent from Congress. They are not nearly
so independent as Article III judges are. They serve limited terms...
at the expiration of which Congress can reduce their salaries, or abol-
ish their offices (selectively if it wishes) so that the judges cannot re-
appoint them.
Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). Of note, many magistrate judges are elevated to
positions in the Article III judiciary after serving as magistrate judges. Fo-
schio, supra note 337, at I1.7.
344. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3); see also supra note 291 and accompanying text.
345. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
346. Id. at 860-61.
347. See id. at 872, 875-76.
348. The defendants made timely objections to the use of the magistrate to
perform these functions. See id.
349. Id. at 864-65 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8, Mathews v. Webber,
423 U.S. 261 (1976) (No. 74-850)); Mathews, 423 U.S. at 268).
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Special Masters' role in the Court's original jurisdiction litiga-
tion extends beyond "ministerial" tasks. Most notably, Special
Masters preside over trials without the express consent of the
parties and control the admission of evidence that shapes the
record for the Court for the only subsequent review. The Spe-
cial Master can also be distinguished from a magistrate based
on the layers of review, the degree of oversight, and the fact
that a magistrate's actions, unlike a Special Master's, are con-
strained by an extensive body of statutes, case law, and appli-
cable rules and procedures. Most importantly, the limitations
placed on magistrates, which prevent them from impaneling a
jury or presiding over trials without the consent of the parties,
are not placed on a Supreme Court Special Master. Not since
the nineteenth century has the Court presided over an original
jurisdiction trial; Supreme Court Special Masters are thus ex-
pected to carry out the critical trial functions in an original ju-
risdiction case.
3. Special Masters in the Federal District Courts
As suggested by the denotation of district court "special
masters," the role of special master is not unique to the Court's
original jurisdiction. The appointment of special masters in
district courts to provide specialized expertise is authorized by
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets
forth the appointment mechanism for special masters in the
district courts. 350 Despite the commonality of special masters
in the federal district courts, the use of special masters in the
Court's original jurisdiction cases is distinguishable in terms of
review, scope, and expertise.
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a special master be appointed in lower court litigation to
act as "a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an assessor."351
The Rule further allows a master to "exercise the power to
regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and
to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the
efficient performance of the master's duties under the order."352
350. FED. R. CIV. P. 53; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.52
(1995) ("Special Masters have increasingly been appointed for their expertise
in particular fields.... Hence the distinction between Special Masters under
Rule 53 and court-appointed experts... has become blurred." (citation omit-
ted)).
351. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a).
352. Id. at (c).
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In this respect, the provisions governing the authority of the
special master in the lower federal courts appear to mirror the
authority granted to Special Masters in the Court's original ju-
risdiction cases. Rule 53 goes on, however, to describe the mas-
ter's duties as they relate to the production of evidence, rulings
on admissibility, the putting of witnesses under oath, and the
examination of vitnesses.353 While the special master in the
district court "shall make a record of the evidence offered and
excluded,"354 Rule 53 also allows the district court special mas-
ter to make findings of fact and conclusions of law if re-
quired. 355
A Rule 53 special master is often used when a district court
entertains highly complex claims involving extensive scientific
or technical facts so that the special master may elucidate key
issues for the court. For these reasons, Rule 53 masters are of-
ten persons skilled in a particular field.356 The Court's Special
Masters, by contrast, are most often senior or retired federal
judges who themselves do not have specialized learning or
training with respect to the litigated claims.357 As Simon
Rifkind noted, speaking of the combined efforts of himself and
his assistant as Special Master, "Both of us started at point
zero. Neither of us knew western water law."358
The use of special masters in the district courts has drawn
some of the same criticisms as those noted herein with respect
to the Court's use of Special Masters.359 As noted earlier, the
Court in La Buy 360 made clear that the district court must re-
tain tight control over special masters and that overloaded
dockets and complicated legal issues alone do not legalize the
practice of extending broad quasi-judicial functions to a special
master.361
For many of the same reasons that Supreme Court Special
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at (e)(1).
356. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extend-
ing the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Cmi. L. REV. 394, 395
(1986) (noting that district court special masters are sometimes appointed to
address the judiciary's general "lack of expertise in esoteric or technologically
sophisticated areas").
357. But see text accompanying notes 122-129.
358. Rifkind, supra note 154, at vi.
359. See Farrell, supra note 324, at 587-98.
360. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
361. Id. at 259-60.
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Masters are distinguishable from ALJs and magistrates, Spe-
cial Masters in the Court are also distinct from court-appointed
experts. Federal judges have the authority to appoint their
own experts, either mutually agreed upon experts or experts of
their own choosing, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.362
Even in highly technical or complex litigation, however, Rule
706 is rarely invoked.3 63 Instead, the judge, acting as a neutral
adjudicator in an adversarial system, overwhelmingly balances
the competing claims advanced by experts put forth by the re-
spective parties. 364 Even in view of the similarities between
special masters in the Court and in the district courts, the cau-
tionary language of La Buy seems particularly appropriate, al-
though it must be remembered that Rule 53, the basis for the
Court's La Buy decision, does not apply to the Court's Special
Masters. The expansive, broad fact-finding disapproved by the
Court in La Buy is highly analogous to the broad mission un-
dertaken by the Court's Special Masters, with the Court's con-
sent. The Court, then, should consider whether it should heed
its own admonition, as set forth by the La Buy Court.
V. MASTER SOLUTIONS
The role of the Special Master in the Court's original juris-
diction cases should be recrafted to resolve the difficulties cur-
rently posed. Various solutions to one or more of the problems
articulated with respect to the Court's use of Special Masters
are available. The most obvious of these, and the one that
362. See FED. R. EVID. 706. Rule 706 provides,
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter
an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed,
and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.
Id.
363. A 1988 study reported that only 20% of all judges had ever appointed
an expert; among those who had appointed experts, most had only made such
an appointment once during the course of their judicial careers. Joe S. Cecil &
Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining A Role for Court-
Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004-05
(1994).
364. Justice Breyer surmises that judges hesitate to appoint experts for
fear that such exercise will "inappropriately deprive the parties of control over
the presentation of a case." Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science
and Law, Address at the 1998 AAAS Annual Meeting (Feb. 16, 1998), at
http://www.aaas.org/meetings/1998/breyer98.htm.
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would eliminate most or all of the problems identified, would be
to restore the trial functions inherent in original jurisdiction
cases to the Court. Other possible solutions include creating a
specialized federal court, establishing concurrent original juris-
diction in the federal district courts, delineating procedures ap-
plicable to original jurisdiction cases, and institutionalizing the
prior practice of appointing senior or retired Article III judges.
The first two of these potential resolutions-restoring trial
functions to the Court and creating a specialized federal
court-must be rejected as overwhelmingly impractical, diffi-
cult to implement, and unlikely to occur. Establishing concur-
rent original jurisdiction in the federal district courts, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist previously has advocated,365 should not be
implemented because such jurisdiction would be susceptible to
creating serious and avoidable interstate tensions, given that
the geographical jurisdiction of the federal district courts is co-
terminous with existing state boundaries. The federal courts of
one state, therefore, would sit in judgment of two or more co-
equal sister states, and judgments of that court could be im-
puted to the state in which such court sat, with unfortunate
consequences to the relationship between the state of the court
and one or more state litigants.
The two most practical and effective solutions that could be
implemented, in light of practical considerations, would be to
delineate a body of procedures applicable to original jurisdic-
tion cases and to institutionalize the prior practice of appoint-
ing senior or retired Article III judges. A clearer, more devel-
oped set of procedures governing original jurisdiction cases
should be implemented, regardless of whether or not any of the
other measures are employed, to ensure consistency across and
among judgments constituting the federal common law appli-
cable to original jurisdiction cases. The practice of appointing
exclusively senior or retired Article III judges to the role of
Special Master, in turn, would resolve the problems of Article
III accountability associated with the current role of the Special
Master.
A. RESTORE MORE TRIAL FUNCTIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT
The simplest and most readily apparent approach to re-
solving many of the concerns regarding the Court's delegation
365. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 762-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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of extensive trial functions to a Special Master is by restoring
these functions to the Justices themselves. If the Court ac-
cepted responsibility for many of the tasks formerly undertaken
by prior Courts in original jurisdiction cases, such as the duty
to rule on motions and preside over trials, the role of a Special
Master would present less of an incursion on the Court's consti-
tutional province in this area.
As noted by some scholars, however, this implicates con-
cerns over the suitability and necessity of a panel of nine Jus-
tices to function as a trial court.366 To alleviate the pressures
that additional original jurisdiction responsibilities would im-
pose on the Justices in excess of their current workload, the
Justices could preside over the proceeding in three-judge pan-
els. This would partially eliminate the practical difficulty of
having "too many cooks in the kitchen" attempting to preside
over the trial, without fully eliminating the structure that the
justices are most familiar with-sitting as part of a multi-judge
tribunal. The Court could thus pare down the scope of the Mas-
ter's authority to the receipt of evidence.
The Justices would likely balk at the prospect of an in-
creased workload, primarily because they have continually re-
iterated that their duties with respect to original jurisdiction
cases shall not interfere with the attention that must be heeded
to cases on their appellate docket, which they deem a higher
priority.367 The Court-which identifies its "paramount role" as
that of the "supreme federal appellate court"36 8 -already justi-
fied the "sparing" exercise of its original jurisdiction as neces-
sary "so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket
will not suffer."369 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing as a then-
Associate Justice in Maryland v. Louisiana, has already said of
original jurisdiction cases that "justice is far better served by
trials in the lower courts, with appropriate review, than by tri-
als before a Special Master whose rulings this Court simply
cannot consider with the care and attention it should."370 The
366. See STERN ET AL., supra note 31, at 482; see also Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971) (stating that the Court is "ill-equipped
for the task of fact-finding and so forced, in original cases, awkwardly to play
the role of fact-finder without actually presiding over the introduction of evi-
dence").
367. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969).
368. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 505.
369. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972) (quoting Wash-
ington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972)).
370. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 763 (1981).
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burden of the Court's appellate docket, however, has lightened
considerably over the course of the last decade, leaving the
Court with greater opportunity to devote resources to the origi-
nal docket than was available in the 1970s and 1980s. The
Court then heard close to two hundred cases per term, a figure
that dropped to fewer than one hundred cases per term
throughout the 1990s, despite the rapid growth of petitions. 371
Further, the original caseload is light. Motions for leave to file
a complaint to commence an original jurisdiction suit, not all of
which are granted, average only three and one-half per year,
and the Court issues an average of only two to three opinions in
original jurisdiction cases per year.372
Restoring authority to the Court would likely best resolve
the difficulties, particularly the Article III difficulties, posed by
the Court's use of Special Masters in its original docket. None-
theless, the Court's articulated preference for its appellate
docket makes the proposal so unlikely as to place it beyond
consideration. Moreover, it is unclear how a party would
launch a challenge to the Court's use of Special Masters that
would ultimately force or persuade the Court to consider the
constitutional dimensions of the Special Master.
B. ESTABLISH A SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COURT
A second proposal is the formation of a specialized federal
court, or court of specialized or limited jurisdiction, which
would share concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court. A specialized federal court could aid in the administra-
tion of original jurisdiction cases for several reasons. First, ap-
pointment of judges to the court through the Article III ap-
pointment mechanism would ensure greater accountability and
independence, if one believes that these aims are achieved, at
least in part, by the life tenure and salary protections. Second,
the specialized federal common law that applies to boundary
and water rights disputes, which constitute the bulk of original
jurisdiction disputes, would be implemented and developed
with a greater degree of consistency because a specialized court
could better preserve institutional memory. Third, a special-
ized court likely would be better equipped to standardize the
procedures applicable to original jurisdiction cases, given their
continued exposure to cases raising similar procedural difficul-
371. BAUMI, supra note 60, at 122-26.
372. See McKusick, supra note 53, at 188.
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ties. Finally, judicial review by the Supreme Court would be
available in the more traditional sense because the Court could
review a decision entered with the full force of Article III judi-
cial authority, thereby arguably granting the benefits of an-
other layer of review.
The original jurisdiction caseload has been steady enough
to make the establishment of a specialized court for original ju-
risdiction cases feasible. Supporters of greater development of
specialist courts-not necessarily in the original jurisdiction
context, but in a variety of circumstances-argue that speciali-
zation increases efficiency.3 73 Creation of a specialized federal
court to handle original jurisdiction disputes, even if one were
to presume the constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction in an
inferior federal court, is unlikely to occur, chiefly because the
resources required to create and support such a court are too
great. The federal judiciary has stated that its long-range plan
does not include "proposals to create new specialized or subject-
matter courts in the judicial branch" because in most instances
"the well-known dangers of judicial specialization outweigh any
such benefits."37 4
A historic view of specialized courts illustrates the benefits
and drawbacks of centering specialized subject matter jurisdic-
tion in a single federal court. The first specialized federal court
was the Court of Customs Appeals, which was established by
Congress in 1909 to hear cases relating to the administration of
tariff laws. 375 The second specialized court, the Commerce
Court, was established just one year later in order to handle
the vast litigation relating to interstate commerce, a conse-
quence of rapid industrialization and transportation ad-
vances.376 The Commerce Court had a short-lived tenure. An
age of distrust of the courts, particularly of older judges to re-
solve disputes so sharply colored by modernization, led to the
373. RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
250 (1996) ("Specialization often enhances efficiency.").
374. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 43 (1995).
375. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 148-52 (1927).
376. Id. at 153-62. The Commerce Court reviewed adjudication from the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and its decisions were reviewable by the
Supreme Court. In the establishment of the Commerce Court, the federal cir-
cuits were divested of their authority to review cases falling within the juris-
diction of the Commerce Court. See id.
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demise of the Commerce Court in 1913. 377 A specialized district
court for resolving land disputes, together with an "appellate
land court," was proposed in the Senate on three occasions dur-
ing the first decade of the 1900s, 378 and a specialized court for
resolving patent issues was proposed in the 1910s and 1920s. 379
The travails of the Commerce Court likely hindered the estab-
lishment of both of these tribunals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
currently is the only specialized Article III appellate court, and
the Court of International Trade is the only specialized Article
III trial court. The United States Court of Federal Claims
380
377. Id. at 162-68, 173. Consequent to the abolition of the Commerce
Court, Congress debated what was to be done with the judges who had been
appointed to the Court. While some argued that the Commerce Court had
been established as an Article HI court, providing the judges with life tenure
in times of good behavior, and thus the judges could not be removed, others
argued that the judgeships were dissolved together with the court. Id. at 168-
73. Frankfurter and Landis quote Roscoe Pound, who articulated the resent-
ment aroused by the judges sitting on the Commerce Court:
[C]ourts are less and less competent to formulate rules for new rela-
tions which require regulation. They have the experience of the past.
But they do not have the facts of the present. They have but one case
before them, to be decided upon the principles of the past, the equities
of the one situation, and the prejudices which the individualism of
common law institutional writers, the dogmas learned in a college
course in economics, and habitual association with the business and
professional class, must inevitably produce.... It is a sound instinct
that objects to an agricultural view of industrial legislation.
Id. at 162 n.84 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21
HARV. L. REV. 383, 403-04 (1908)).
378. See 45 CONG. REC. 2947. The proposal dealt largely with disputes be-
tween the United States and other parties over title to land and did not appear
to address boundary disputes between states. See id.
379. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 375, at 174-86. Congress in
1920 voted against the establishment of a specialized court for patent litiga-
tion. The Court did not hinder the establishment of the Patent Court, the ne-
cessity of which was founded on the technical expertise required to evaluate
the claims before it and in support of which it was stated that the body of law
did not rely on general principles of common law. See id.
380. The current Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court derived from
part of the former Court of Claims, which was an Article HI court. The Court
of Claims was originally established in 1855 to hear cases referred by Con-
gress that alleged claims against the United States and was only authorized to
issue advisory opinions. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212-13
(1983); Helen Herschkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1869 n.190 (2001).
While the Court of Claims was initially empowered only "to hear
claims and report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a private
bill in each case which received a favorable decision," President Lincoln in his
1861 State of the Union address announced the expansion of the Court of
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and the United States Tax Court are specialized Article I
courts;381 the United States bankruptcy courts are specialized
federal courts, but they are considered "units" of the federal
district courts, and their judges are not subject to the appoint-
ment provisions or protections of Article 111.382 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by The Federal
Court Improvements Act of 1982383 and was granted appellate
jurisdiction over patent appeals from federal district courts and
from the Patent and Trademark Office. 384 The Federal Circuit
court is only semi-specialized, however, because Congress also
gave the Federal Circuit Court jurisdiction over cases appealed
from The Board of Contract Appeals, The Court of Interna-
tional Trade, The United States Court of Federal Claims, The
Court of Veterans Appeals, The International Trade Commis-
sion, The Merit Systems Protection Board, The Patent and
Trademark Office, and unfair competition cases originating in
the United States District Courts.385 The Court of Interna-
tional Trade has jurisdiction over certain international trade
disputes, including appeals of administrative decisions by the
Claim's authority to include rendering final judgments, abolishing the role of
Congress as an intermediary. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212-13 (citations omitted).
In its 1962 decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), however,
the Court held that this "referral" power by Congress was fundamentally in-
compatible with Article III, which expresses "the Framers' desire to safeguard
the independence of the judicial from the other branches by confining its ac-
tivities to 'cases of a Judiciary nature.' Id. at 582.
After being converted into an Article III court following the Glidden
decision, the trial and appellate divisions were divided in the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). The
trial court division became the current Court of Federal Claims, while the ap-
pellate division was merged with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to
become the current Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Elizabeth
Wallace Fleming, Practice in the Court of Federal Claims, 35 PROCUREMENT
LAW. 3, 5 n.9 (2000).
381. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1994) (The Court of Federal Claims "is declared to
be a court established under article I of the Constitution of the United
States."); 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1994) ("There is hereby established, under article I
of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the
United States Tax Court.").
382. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-153 (1994); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441-7443A (1994).
383. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
385. Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146 (1994); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
4-5 & n.29 (1989). Dreyfuss suggests, based on a review of the legislative his-
tory, that the Supreme Court's lack of expertise over patent appeals served as
an impetus for the creation of the Federal Circuit Court, as did a desire to
eliminate forum shopping in patent cases. Id.
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Department of Commerce, the International Trade Commis-
sion, and Customs Service rulings. 386 Interestingly, the statute
providing for the appointment of judges to the Court of Interna-
tional Trade has a built-in anti-bias mechanism in that it al-
lows not more than five of the nine appointed judges to be
members of the same political party.38 7
On the whole, critics of specialized federal courts have pos-
ited that such courts "acquire the vices of specialization-
narrowness and partiality."388 In his book on the federal
courts, Judge Richard Posner reports on speculation that
judges appointed to specialized courts, as experts, "are more
sensitive to swings in professional opinion than an outsider, a
generalist, would be."389 For those once-in-history cases involv-
ing disputes over billionaire estates, broken collegiate football
schedules, or apportionment of post-War debt, fears that a sin-
gle court would always side the same way in cases in which two
competing theories are at issue are unfounded. But the most
common types of cases-border disputes and water rights-
might be susceptible to Posner's criticism. In border dispute
cases that rely on waterway boundaries, waterways may be
split as between a border demarcated by the "thalwag," or the
deepest point in the waterway, or a border demarcated by the
center of the waterway. Creation of a specialized court might
allow one "theory" to prevail over another in a series of cases,
at least until the composition of the court changed.
The concern that specialized courts would create a monop-
oly within a field is more valid if "specialized court" is under-
stood as a court of specialists. Some commentators have ar-
386. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2643(a)(2) (1994). In his article
on specialized courts for patent litigation, John B. Pegram offers the following
brief history of the Court of International Trade:
The Board of General Appraisers was established in 1890 to supervise
appraisements and classifications for customs purposes. It replaced
federal trial courts in customs matters in 1909 and became the
United States Customs Court, an Article I court, in 1926. In 1956, it
became an Article III court and was renamed the United States Court
of International Trade ("CIT") in 1980. The CIT currently has all the
powers in law and equity of a federal district court.
John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 765, 782 (2000).
387. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1994).
388. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 375, at 151 (discussing early
twentieth-century Senate debate over the establishment of the specialized
Court of Customs).
389. POSNER, supra note 373, at 251.
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gued that a "specialized court" need not be filled by specialists
or experts because the purpose "is not to create a court of ex-
perts or specialists but to maximize coherence and predictabil-
ity in federal law through continuity and stability of decision
makers."390 Given the danger that exposure to a volume of
cases of narrow scope might increase the narrowness of deci-
sions, semi-specialized courts might be more effective and pro-
tect against some of the vices of fully specialized courts.3 91 This
semi-specialization in original jurisdiction might be achieved
naturally, given the range of cases that arise under the original
jurisdiction. Another alternative would be to merge a special-
ized court for original jurisdiction cases with another special-
ized federal court, either the Federal Circuit or another not-yet-
created specialized federal court, to provide additional variety
to the primarily boundary dispute and water rights cases in the
Court's original jurisdiction.
Three additional criticisms of specialized judicial systems
are worthy of mention. First, some argue that federal special-
ized courts are more susceptible to legislative or executive con-
trol through appointments because it "is easier to predict how
judges will decide cases in their specialty than how they will
decide cases across the board."392 The President and Congress
might then use their predictive capabilities in making ap-
pointments to the court, shaping the direction of the court and
depriving it of the independence achieved by generalist federal
courts. 393 Second, review by the Court might additionally be
hampered if members of the Court, as generalists, are prone to
defer to the decisions of specialist judges, as the Court's review
of Federal Circuit decisions suggests the Justices might be.394
Finally, judges on a specialized court generally attain less pres-
tige than do their generalist counterparts.3 95 Whether this
390. The Honorable S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the
Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on
the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 864 (1990) (quoting Daniel J.
Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design
of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 603, 611-12 (1989)).
391. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
67, 71-72 (1995).
392. POSNER, supra note 373, at 254.
393. Id.
394. Id. (citing Mark J. Abate & Edmund Fish, Supreme Court Review of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1982-1992, 2 FED.
CIR. B. J. 307 (1992)).
395. Id. at 250; Stempel, supra note 391, at 83 ("[Tlhere is stigma in
specialization.").
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diminution in prestige results in poorer quality decision-
making is subject to debate.3 96
Because the judges on a specialized court would be ap-
pointed through the constitutional appointment process and
would therefore have Article III salary and tenure protection,
the establishment of such a court would achieve greater ac-
countability than currently exists. The primary drawbacks of
specialized courts, however, might nonetheless counsel against
the creation of a specialized court: learned dependence of other
courts, the accretion of control by a handful of judges over all
disputes arising in the Court's original jurisdiction, and the
vast resources necessary to carve out a new judicial body
within the Article III construct. Whether greater expertise
could be obtained likely is a draw: An "original jurisdiction"
court could attract specialists in the area of boundary disputes
and water rights, the two primary subjects of original jurisdic-
tion suits, but, as evidenced by the brief biographies of Special
Masters who have served in original jurisdiction suits, there is
no question but that most, if not all, are talented and capable
attorneys.
C. ESTABLISH CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS
As noted earlier, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist has
stated that he would prefer that the exclusive nature of original
jurisdiction be stripped by Congress so that the federal district
courts could act as courts of original jurisdiction.397 Congress
has already vested concurrent original jurisdiction in the dis-
trict courts for each of the other enumerated original jurisdic-
tion categories: actions involving ambassadors, public ministers
or other foreign consulate officers, controversies between the
United States and a state, and all actions or proceedings by a
state against non-citizen persons.398 Given that concurrent
original jurisdiction has been vested in other federal courts by
Congress in other categories of original jurisdiction cases, cre-
396. See POSNER, supra note 373, at 250 (noting that even if a specialized
judiciary attracted less able lawyers than the generalist judiciary, "it does not
follow that the specialized judiciary would do a worse job than the present
generalist judiciary"); Stempel, supra note 391, at 83 ("Specialization is trou-
bling when it appears to produce second-rate adjudication.").
397. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 762-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
398. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
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ating a federal forum with concurrent original jurisdiction
would not pose a constitutional difficulty. The provision grant-
ing the Court exclusive original jurisdiction is one effected by
congressional mandate, not constitutional mandate.
Should Congress grant concurrent jurisdiction to the dis-
trict courts, two results would be almost certain: The Court
would uniformly refuse to act as the court of first instance, but
would be available for appellate review. Specifically, where the
district court has concurrent original jurisdiction, the Court of-
ten refuses to grant a motion for leave to file a complaint on the
grounds that another suitable forum is available. However, the
Court, if it later hears the case, can function in the capacity of
an appellate tribunal, as it is better accustomed to doing, en-
suring greater protection of state interests through multi-
layered appellate review.
While vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts
may be appropriate for cases against ambassadors, however, it
may prove unsatisfactory for handling disputes between states,
as it would involve concerns of parochial partiality and friction
between states as separate sovereigns. The primary reason
that district courts will be unsuitable for disputes between
states is that jurisdiction in the district courts-whose own
boundaries have from the beginning been coterminous with the
borders of states in which they sit-would implicate concerns of
bias that led to the establishment of federal courts in the first
place.399 For example, in a dispute between the states of Mis-
sissippi and Arkansas, venue and jurisdiction seem most
proper in both Mississippi and Arkansas, although only one can
exercise jurisdiction over the case.
The risk of geographical partiality of the judges and jurors
also creates a basis for concern. Many of the judges are drawn
from the region in which they adjudicate, raising at least a
minimum level of concern for their partiality with regard to
preserving borders in the district where venue is appropriate,
even if their insulation from other state prejudices is a valid
claim. Jurors, too, in federal district courts are cut from the
same cloth as their state court counterparts and are therefore
likely to display the same biases, particularly on issues that re-
gard state services, taxes, etc.4°° In sum, district courts are not
399. See FRANKFuRTER & LANDIS, supra note 375, at 10.
400. JACKSON, supra note 80, at 33 ("It is difficult today to judge whether
in 1789 the fear that state courts might do less than justice to out-of-state liti-
gants was warranted. Since the jurors for either federal or state courts would
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well-suited to preside over original jurisdiction disputes be-
tween states, weighing against the creation of concurrent origi-
nal jurisdiction over state-against-state disputes.
D. DELINEATE PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION CASES
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court Special Mas-
ters are required to adhere to few set rules when presiding over
original jurisdiction proceedings. Creation and imposition of
rules governing these proceedings are central to ensuring the
integrity of the proceedings. A procedural framework is nec-
essary to ensure the uniformity of judgments both across cases
and within cases, particularly when the extended nature of the
litigation may require the appointment of successive Special
Masters. In addition, the integrity of the fact-finding process
must be protected in a manner that does not raise additional
concerns about unfair processes or procedures, given the sensi-
tive and pervasive issues stemming from the interests of state
parties and the lack of multilayered review. The Court's mini-
mal oversight, the piecemeal precedent in most cases, and the
lack of experience of the majority of Special Masters in officiat-
ing over original jurisdiction cases also militate in favor of in-
creased procedures. The benefits of such rules would parallel
those that have evolved from the development of federal rules
of civil procedure and evidence. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence reflect the view that
litigation in the federal courts requires court-fashioned proce-
dures and rules in order to ensure the uniformity of civil judg-
ments.401 This uniformity is an articulated principal goal of the
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court.40 2 Uniformity
should also be a principal goal in original jurisdiction cases,
leaning in favor of new procedural rules governing the ap-
be drawn from the same locality, they would seem to carry the same prejudices
into the jury box of either court.").
401. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemak-
ing, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888-
93 (1999).
402. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("One of the shaping pur-
poses of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by
getting away from local rules"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Fried-
man, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 780-82
(1995); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uni-
formity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1999, 2002-05 (1989).
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pointment of Special Masters and the related Special Master
proceedings.
The push to develop the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
preceded that favoring the Federal Rules of Evidence. Many
commentators criticized the numerous common law procedures
for both law and equity, arguing that the rules were too cum-
bersome and were threatening the integrity of judgments ren-
dered in the federal system because of the lack of uniformity
across jurisdictions.4 3 These critics additionally argued that
the lack of rules was responsible for backlog, litigation delay,
and high litigation costs, and they urged new rules that would
liberalize discovery.40 4 Proponents of new procedural rules for
the federal courts sought to achieve this uniformity by pushing
for court-created rules with four fundamental characteristics:
flexibility, simplicity, clarity, and efficiency.40 5
For more than twenty years, beginning in 1911, Congress
failed to pass a bill that would authorize the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for the federal courts.406 The bills were re-
403. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 426-32 (cita-
tions omitted).
404. Bone, supra note 401, at 889-90 (stating that the Advisory Committee
was prompted "by concerns about case backlog, litigation delay, and high liti-
gation costs"); see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The His-
torical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691,
691-92 (1998) (stating that the Federal Rules discovery provisions "dramati-
cally increased the potential for discovery").
405. See WRIGHT, supra note 403, at 429; see also Bone, supra note 401, at
895 (citations omitted).
Controversy arose over whether Congress, which was charged with
creating substantive law, should be divested of its rulemaking power in order
for the courts to draft new procedural laws. Many argued that court-made
procedures for civil litigation were necessary because Congress, while compe-
tent to craft substantive law, was too unfamiliar with the administrative func-
tions of the federal judiciary to craft useful procedural rules to guide the
courts. See Bone, supra note 401, at 896 ("From these premises, it followed
that a democratic process was not necessary to the legitimacy of procedure, for
procedure involved no substantive value choices.").
Some critics of court rulemaking argue that greater authority should
be granted to the legislative branch for the purposes of achieving greater ac-
countability. See id. at 888-89 (citing Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,
Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure
and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 754-59 (1993)). The courts also
had greater insulation from political pressures and special interests that
might have tainted either the rulemaking process or the substance of the rules
themselves. Bone, supra note 401, at 896.
406. WRIGHT, supra note 403, at 427. Wright notes that Congress's serious
consideration of developing uniform federal rules of procedure began after the
American Bar Association in 1911 adopted a resolution advocating the adop-
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jected partly out of fear that the sophisticated common law
rules that had developed in the eastern states would overrun
the newly developed rules being instituted in the western
states.40 7 Finally, in 1934, a bill was passed authorizing prom-
ulgation of uniform federal rules by the Supreme Court;408 the
Supreme Court the following year appointed an Advisory
Committee, whose Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became ef-
fective in 1938.409 Strangely, while the Court had oversight au-
thority, none of the persons appointed by Chief Justice Hughes
to the original Advisory Committee, including two-time Special
Master Monte Lemann, had ever been judges.410 Nonetheless,
the committee reacted to feedback from the judiciary, and the
resulting rules governed the multifarious aspects of civil proce-
dure, from the form of filings and service to dictates for the dis-
covery process.
The Supreme Court Rules currently mandate that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure govern the form of pleadings in
original jurisdiction cases.411 Other procedural rules, aside
from those applicable to pleadings, however, would be helpful
in the Court's original jurisdiction cases. Discovery rules, for
example, do not apply in the current original jurisdiction re-
gime. Application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would not only promote the fairness and integrity of the pro-
ceedings, two goals of the rules, but would also promote pre-
dictability throughout the course of the proceedings. The pre-
dictability of the proceedings is particularly important in
original jurisdiction cases because they can last for decades and
require numerous Special Masters. Greater application of civil
procedure rules would help minimize the variances that occur
across different Special Master appointments.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were fashioned for many of
the same reasons as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 102 provides that the rules aim "to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
tion of a system of federal rules. Id.
407. See id.
408. The act, the Rules Enabling Act, currently is codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (1994) and provides continued authority to the Court to promulgate fed-
eral court rules.
409. See WRIGHT, supra note 403, at 428.
410. See Drahozal, supra note 152, at 490 & n.110 (1998); Stephen C.
Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 232
(1998).
411. See SUP. CT. R. 17.
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and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."412 An Advisory Committee was
constituted in 1965, but the Federal Rules of Evidence were not
enacted until 1975 after considerable controversy and the pas-
sage of a statute that gave Congress the right of authority over
the rules' ultimate enactment. 413
Original jurisdiction cases are not fundamentally different
from the gamut of cases subject to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Some of the rules arguably would never apply to an
original jurisdiction proceeding, but that is true for many of the
rules that do not apply in all categories of cases, particularly
those rules specific to criminal proceedings. For example, rules
related to evidence of character or impeachment by prior
crime414 are provided as protections to criminal defendants and
thus probably would not be relevant to the vast majority of
original jurisdiction cases. Rules designed to protect the inter-
ests of a criminal defendant, such as rules circumscribing char-
acter and credibility evidence, however, can be sifted out from
rules designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process,
such as the rules regarding the admissibility of expert evidence
and the Best Evidence Rule. 415 The Court should examine the
utility of other evidentiary rules, including those that protect
legitimate party interests but that might nevertheless obstruct
the fact-finding mission of a Supreme Court Special Master's
processes, such as self-incrimination and privileges.
Given the overarching importance of and limited review in
original jurisdiction cases, rules regarding authentication,
identification, and "best evidence" should play a crucial role in
determining the admissibility of evidence.416 Authentication
and identification rules, patterned on the need for authentica-
tion as "an inherent logical necessity," are designed to establish
relevance and prevent fraud.417 The Best Evidence Rule is also
designed to prevent fraud, in addition to securing for the fact-
412. FED. R. EVID. 102.
413. See WRIGHT, supra note 403, at 430.
414. See FED. R. EvID. 608, 609.
415. See FED. R. EVID. 702-705, 1001-1008.
416. See FED. R. EVID. 901 (Requirement of Authentication or Identifica-
tion), 902 (Self-authentication), 1001-1008 (Best Evidence Rule).
417. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) advisory committee's note (quoting 7 WIGMORE
564, at § 2129).
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finder the most reliable evidence available.4 18 In boundary dis-
pute cases the outcome may very well turn on compacts, deeds,
land records, and conflicting written interpretations, the reso-
lution of which would be better insured by strict adherence to
these rules. Adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence, there-
fore, might help guarantee a necessary level of confidence in
the evidence.
The rules governing expert testimony also might prove use-
ful given the critical role experts play in the Court's original ju-
risdiction cases.419 Despite the growing complexity of federal
cases, many cases in the district courts proceed without ex-
perts. In original jurisdiction cases, by contrast, experts have
proved to be a practical necessity, particularly in cases in which
the Special Master has no formal expertise in the substance of
the dispute. In boundary disputes, a surveyor can be benefi-
cial; in water diversion disputes, an expert in natural resource
law or water law is needed; in a case over escheated securities,
a securities expert will testify. Again, the need to secure sound
expertise for the Special Master is as-or more-important in
original jurisdiction cases than in federal district court litiga-
tion. No strong interest therefore appears for deviating from
the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding the admission of ex-
pert testimony.
The set of evidentiary rules that could potentially frustrate
the fact-finding process in original jurisdiction cases would be
rules relating to hearsay, which are designed to prevent the
admission of unreliable out-of-court statements. The rules gov-
erning hearsay are intricate and complex; Rule 803 maintains
twenty-four categorical exceptions, and Rule 804 maintains
six. 420 The need to discover evidence in many original jurisdic-
tion cases that run historically deep, as many boundary dis-
putes do, for example, may require modification of some hear-
say rules. More specifically, the hearsay rules attempt to
ensure reliability of testimony by allowing only a speaker to
testify as to his statements, unless one of select indicia of reli-
ability, enumerated in the hearsay exceptions, is present. In
418. See FED. R. EvID. 1001 advisory committee's note.
419. See FED. R. EVID. 702-706. The rules regarding expert testimony have
been explicated in a triad of Court cases, each of relatively recent vintage.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
420. FED. R. EvED. 803, 804.
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many original jurisdiction cases, which may span many dec-
ades and even centuries, the availability of witnesses will be
highly curtailed. Accordingly, the interest in the availability of
relevant evidence might justify deviation from strict application
of hearsay rules. Relaxed hearsay rules-or expanded excep-
tions-in original jurisdiction cases thus might be necessary.
Standardized rules of procedure and evidence are not with-
out their critics. Criticisms of uniform laws in the federal
courts likely mimic those justifications for the bare rules avail-
able in original jurisdiction cases. Chief among these criticisms
is that cases need individualized, tailored procedures that can-
not be exacted in the framework of extensive rules. Others
may argue that uniform procedures memorialize one particular
set of rules that may not reflect the interests of the various par-
ties that will come before the Court.421 The latter criticism
largely challenges the ability of rule drafters to understand suf-
ficiently the litigation interests of parties of different statures
and of different geographic regions to create rules that will be
fair to those litigants. The need for predictability and for en-
suring uniformity-as much within a case as between cases-is
substantial enough to outweigh heavily these criticisms.
E. INSTITUTIONALIZE THE PRIOR PRACTICE OF APPOINTING
SENIOR OR RETIRED ARTICLE III JUDGES
If the Article III difficulty posed by Special Masters is the
matter of chief concern, this problem could be remedied largely
by reversion to the practice of appointing senior or retired fed-
eral judges as Special Masters. Although the practice of ap-
pointing senior or retired federal judges was abandoned in or-
der to allow senior judges to devote greater time to the
increasing district court dockets or appellate caseloads,422 it
appears unlikely that duties of senior judges, who have reduced
job requirements under their senior status, would preempt ap-
pointment to an original jurisdiction case. A senior judge, for
example, needs only to complete in each twelve-month period
the workload that an active non-senior judge would accomplish
in a three-month period.423 In addition, numerous vacancies
are available on the federal bench that, if filled, would allow
421. See Bone, supra note 401.
422. See Telephone Interview with Francis J. Lorson, supra note 98.
423. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 44 tbl. 1-10 (2d ed. 1996).
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senior judges to lighten their caseloads.
Senior or retired judges might also be better able to isolate
an original jurisdiction case from other competing duties. Such
judges, as a consequence of their lighter caseload, would not
have to be subject to the pull of other cases on appeal or to
other responsibilities of the workaday world. Senior or retired
judges might also be more accustomed to, and thus more likely
to implement and adhere to, the procedures and rules that gov-
ern litigation in an Article III forum. Thus, if one accepts the
premise that original jurisdiction cases would benefit from in-
creased uniformity through increased application of rules, this
result might more likely be obtained through the use of senior
or retired justices intimately familiar not only with the rules,
but how they play out in practice. Although appointing senior
or retired judges might reduce the ability to appoint subject-
matter specialists, such as in cases involving water rights dis-
putes, procedures for court-appointed experts-or even the use
of party experts-should resolve sufficiently the need for exper-
tise. In any event, the need for subject-matter expertise in a
given lawsuit likely does not outweigh the need for Article III
accountability in a suit between states.
While this reversion to appointing senior or retired federal
judges would alleviate some concerns of accountability, given
that this class of judges would have withstood the constitu-
tional appointment mechanisms, it leaves other difficulties un-
resolved. Consider, for example, the argument articulated ear-
lier that retired and senior judges, due to their age, are more
likely to resign or pass away during service as a Special Mas-
ter. This vulnerability is particularly important given both the
multi-year proceedings in many original jurisdiction suits and
the absence of set procedures to guide such a judge's successor,
which could potentially disrupt the proceedings.
Moreover, as long as the class of senior and retired federal
judges is heavily represented by older white males, critics
might argue that the role of Special Master fails to benefit from
the perspectives that youth, women, and minorities can bring
to bear on the rights of citizens falling across the racial and so-
cioeconomic spectrum. As women and other racial and ethnic
minorities are increasingly represented in the federal judiciary
they presumably, over time, would find themselves standing in
the role of Special Master with greater frequency than has oc-
curred in the past. Further, even if underrepresented at pre-
sent, the ranks of senior and retired federal judges already
20021
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have greater representation of women and minorities than the
ranks of Special Masters appointed in the Supreme Court.
Despite the drawbacks of appointing senior or retired fed-
eral judges as the Court's Special Masters, the benefits tri-
umph. The Article III difficulties posed by the Court's use of
Special Masters at present are not to be taken lightly. In an
era when the Court appears willing to accept the delegation of
many Article III functions or quasi-judicial functions to judicial
adjuncts, the Special Masters option in original jurisdiction
litigation between states is an area deserving of special protec-
tion. Such suits are almost always between states acting as
private litigants, which have not consented to the delegation of
rights to a non-Article III actor. At bottom, the use of senior or
retired federal judges as Special Masters mimics, in a sense,
dual-tiered judicial review and places power to decide motions
and preside over trials in an actor who, importantly, has
achieved Article III accountability.
CONCLUSION
For a court that takes seriously its duties as an appellate
court overseeing the nation's countless state and federal courts,
the Supreme Court undoubtedly views the duty to function as a
trial court in the handful of original jurisdiction cases that en-
ter its docket each year as an onerous task. But in recognizing
its limitations as a fact-finding body, the Supreme Court has
delegated away primary responsibilities in original jurisdiction
cases to Special Masters, who may exercise great discretion
over suits without the accountability or protections of the Arti-
cle III judiciary.
Given the Framers' interest in precluding states from exer-
cising jurisdiction over disputes with sister states, the Court's
exercise of original jurisdiction with the use of Special Masters
is at least consistent with providing states with a neutral fo-
rum. The fundamental reasons the role of the Special Master
is disconcerting, however, are attributable to the broad scope of
his authority, the significance of the interests involved in state-
against-state litigations, and the lack of multilayered judicial
review.
The primary need in Special Master proceedings is the
adoption of a set of procedures that would increase consistency
and reduce incongruous results among and within cases. While
sensibility also counsels that the Court retract some of the au-
thority granted to Special Masters, the more workable ap-
[Vol.86:625
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proach would be to reinstate the practice of appointing only re-
tired or senior federal judges to the Special Master position,
who have attained their positions through the constitutional
appointment process and who are entitled to life tenure and
salary protection. This alternative would alleviate the pres-
sures original jurisdiction cases add to the Court, which the
Court likely is unwilling to take back, while still ensuring
greater accountability in the role of the Special Master.
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APPENDIX
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES IN WHICH A SPECIAL MASTER
HAS BEEN APPOINTED
This Appendix seeks to summarize basic information
regarding the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction cases in
which Special Masters were appointed and provide brief bio-
graphical data for the Special Masters. The biographical data
presented for the Special Masters set forth the position held by
the Special Master at the time of appointment, as well as rele-
vant governmental service. All data contained in this appendix
are based on a reasonable inquiry of the following sources: the
Supreme Court Reporter; the Federal Reporter Series; the Fed-
eral Supplement Series; Lee Seltman, Working Paper of the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force: Appointments to the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit (1992); Note, The Origi-
nal Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 665, 669 (1959); and sources cited infra notes 98-162.
Legend:
- insufficient data
t commissioner appointed to take evidence
D died in position
R resigned from position
* date not based on Court's order granting motion for leave to
file
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Special Master (year
appointed)
Case Subject Suit Final Position at Time of Ap-
of Suit Begun Resolution pointment and Rele-
vant Experience
Kansas v. water ap- 1999 pending Vincent L. McKusick
Nebraska portion- (1999)
ment Retired Chief Justice,
state supreme court
New York v. state 1994 1999 (final Paul Verkuil (1994)
New Jersey boundary decree) President, private corpo-
(New York dispute ration; Dean, Cardozo
and New Law School; President
Jersey Emeritus, William &
Boundary Mary; former Dean,
Case) Tulane University
Louisiana v. state 1993 1995 (final Vincent L. McKusick
Mississippi boundary decree) (1994)
dispute/ Retired Chief Justice,
suit to state supreme court
quiet title
to land and
water
Connecticut dispute 1992 1993 (case Vincent L. McKusick
v. New over state dismissed) (1992)
Hampshire tax on nu- Retired Chief Justice,
clear plant state supreme court
property
Delaware v. dispute 1988 1994 (case Thomas H. Jackson (1988)
New York over es- dismissed) Dean and professor, Uni-
cheated versity of Virginia School
securities of Law; former professor,
Stanford Law School
Wyoming v. Commerce 1988 1992 Philip W. Tone (1989)
Oklahoma Clause Private practitioner; for-
challenge mer judge, federal court of
appeals
Oklahoma v. water ap- 1987 1993 (modi- Jerome C. Muys (1988)
New Mexico portion- fled decree) Private practitioner;
ment Supreme Court advocate
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Illinois v. state 1986 1995 (final Robert Van Pelte (1987)
Kentucky boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
Matthew J. Jasen (1988)
Private practioner; retired
judge, state supreme court
Nebraska v. water ap- 1986 pending Owen Olpin (1987)
Wyoming portion- Private practitioner
(Nebraska II) ment
New Jersey Commerce 1985 1988 (case Wade H. McCree, Jr.'
v. Nevada Clause dismissed) (1986)
challenge Professor, University of
Michigan Law School; for-
mer Solicitor General; for-
mer judge, federal court of
appeals and federal district
court, state trial court
Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr.
(1987)
Private practitioner
South challenge 1984 1988 Honorable Samuel J.
Carolina v. to IRS (opinion) Roberts' (1984)
Baker provision Justice, state supreme
(formerly court
South Matthew J. Jasen (1987)
Carolina v. Private practitioner; re-
Regan) tired judge, state supreme
court
Arkansas v. state 1982 1985 (final Paul C. Reardon (1982)
Mississippi boundary decree) Retired justice, state su-
dispute preme court
California v. dispute 1982 1985 (case Wade H. McCree, Jr. (1982)
Texas over right dismissed) Professor, University of
to estate Michigan Law School; for-
taxes mer Solicitor General; for-
mer judge, federal court of
appeals and federal district
court, state trial court
Louisiana v. state 1980 1984 (final Charles J. Meyers (1981)
Missisippi boundary order) Private practitioner
dispute
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Texas v. state 1980 1982 (final John A. Carver (1980)
Oklahoma boundary decree) Professor, University of
dispute Denver College of Law;
former Assistant Secretary
of the Interior
California v. state and 1979 1981 (final Roy W. Harper (1979)
Arizona federal decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
boundary trict court
dispute
Kentucky v. state 1979 1985 (final Robert Van Pelt (1979)
Indiana boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
Maryland v. commerce 1979 1981 (final John F. Davis (1980)
Louisiana clause decree) Former Clerk of the Court,
challenge United States Supreme
Court; former Assistant So-
licitor General
United dispute 1979 Pending J. Keith Mann (1980)
States v. over min- Associate Dean and Profes-
Alaska eral rights/ sor, Stanford Law School
suit to Gregory E. Maggs (2000)
quiet title Professor, George Wash-
to land ington National Law
Center
Colorado v. water ap- 1978 1984 (case Ewing I. Kerr (1979)
New Mexico portion- dismissed) Senior judge, federal dis-
ment trict court
Oklahoma v. state 1978 1985 (final William H. Becker (1979)
Arkansas boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
Tennessee v. state 1978 1981 (final Earl R. Larson (1979)
Arkansas boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
California v. state 1977 1982 (final Robert Van Pelt (1977)
Nevada boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
Indiana v. state 1977 1985 (final Robert Van Pelt (--)
Kentucky boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute _trict court
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Idaho ex rel. dispute 1976 1983 Jean Sala Breitenstein
Evans v. over ap- (opinion) (1977)
Oregon portion- Senior judge, federal court
ment of of appeals
migrating
fish
South state 1976 1982 (final Oren Harris (1976)
Dakota v. boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
Nebraska dispute trict court
Texas v. New water ap- 1975 1993 Jean Sala Breitenstein
Mexico portion- (amended (1975)
ment decree) Senior judge, federal court
of appeals
Charles J. MeyersD (1984)
Private practitioner; Dean
Emeritus, Stanford Law
School
D. Monte Pascoe (1988)
Private practitioner
New state 1973 1977 (final Tom C. Clark (1973)
Hampshire v. boundary decree) Retired Justice, United
Maine dispute States Supreme Court
United dispute 1972 1978 (case Charles L. PowellD (1972)
States v. over right dismissed) Senior judge, federal dis-
Florida to restrict trict court
foreign Olin Hatfield Chilson
vessels in (1975)
coastal wa- Senior judge, federal dis-
ters (for- trict court
eign policy/
foreign
relations)
Vermont v. suit to 1972 1974 (case R. Ammi Cutter (1972)
New York abate pub- dismissed) Retired justice, state
lic nui- supreme court
sance (air
pollution)
Mississippi v. state 1971 1974 Clifford O'Sullivan (1971)
Arkansas boundary (amended Senior judge, federal court
dispute decree) of appeals
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Pennsylvania dispute 1970 1972 (final John F. Davis (1970)
v. New York over es- decree) Former Clerk of the Court,
cheated United States Supreme
fumds Court; former Assistant
Solicitor General
Texas v. state 1970 1977 (final Robert Van Pelt (1970)
Louisiana boundary decree) Senior judge, federal dis-
dispute trict court
United suit to 1969 1986 Albert B. Marls (1970)
States v. quiet title (opinion) Senior judge, federal court
Maine to seabed of appeals; former judge,
federal district court; for-
mer Chief Judge, federal
Emergency Court of
Appeals
Walter E. Hoffman (1977)
Senior judge, federal dis-
trict court
Michigan v. state 1967 1973 (final Albert B. Marls (1967)
Ohio boundary decree) Senior judge, federal court
dispute of appeals
Missouri v. state 1967 1974 (case Gilbert H. Jertberg (1967)
Nebraska boundary dismissed) Senior judge, federal court
dispute of appeals
Utah v. suit to 1967 1976 (final J. Cullen GaneyD (1967)
United quiet title decree) Senior judge, federal court
States to lake and of appeals
relicted Charles Fahy (1972)
land Senior judge, federal court
of appeals
Ohio v. state 1966 1985 (final Phillip Forman (1966)
Kentucky boundary decree) Senior judge, federal court
dispute of appeals
Robert Van Pelt (-)
Senior judge, federal dis-
trict court
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Illinois v. state 1965 1970 (final Sam E. WhitakerR (1966)
Missouri boundary decree) Senior judge, federal Court
dispute of Claims
Harvey M. Johnsen (1967)
Senior judge, federal court
of appeals
Nebraska v. state 1965 1973 (final Joseph W. MaddenR (1965)
Iowa boundary decree) Senior judge, federal Court
dispute of Claims
Honorable Walter L. PopeR
(1965)
Senior judge, federal appel-
late court
Honorable Charles J.
VogeiR (1968)
Senior judge, federal appel-
late court
Joseph P. Wilson (1968)
Senior Judge, federal dis-
trict court
Louisiana v. state 1963 1966 (final Marvin Jones (1964)
Mississippi boundary decree) Chief Judge, federal Court
dispute of Claims
Texas v. New dispute 1962 1965 (final Walter A. Huxman (1963)
Jersey over es- decree) Senior Judge, federal ap-
cheated pellate court
debt
Virginia v. dispute 1957 1963 (case Stanley F. Reed (1958)
Maryland over fish- settled) Retired Justice, United
ing and States Supreme Court
crabbing
rights in
Potomac
River
Mississippi v. state 1953 1955 (final D. K McKamy (1953)
Louisiana boundary decree) Private practitioner
dispute
Texas v. New 1952 1957 (case John Raeburn Green
Mexico dismissed) (1952)
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United federal- 1950 1982 (final Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.
States v. state order) (1969)
Louisiana boundary Private practitioner;
(Louisiana dispute Supreme Court advocate
Boundary Albert B. Marls (1971)
case) Senior Judge, federal court
of appeals
Georgia v. dispute 1945 1950 (case Lloyd K. Garrison (1945)
Pennsylvania over harm dismissed) Chair, War Labor Board;
RR to citizens Dean and professor, Uni-
from rail- versity of Wisconsin Law
road rate School; former Solicitor
fixing General; former Special
Assistant to the Attorney
General
United federal- 1945 1952 William H. Davis (1949)
States v. state Private practitioner;
California boundary Supreme Court advocate
dispute
United suit to 1944 1948 (final Nat U. Brown (1945)
States v. quiet title order) Private practitioner
Wyoming to land
Illinois v. - 1943 1950 (final Luther Ely Smith (1944)
Indiana order) Public interest lawyer
(ACLU)
Missouri v. - 1937 1939 (case Samuel Williston (1938)
Iowa dismissed) Professor, Harvard Law
School
Texas v. dispute 1937 1939 (final John S. Flannery (1937)
Florida over decree) Private practitioner;
estate Supreme Court advocate
taxes
Nebraska v. water ap- 1934 1945 (final Michael J. Doherty (1935)
Wyoming portion- decree) Private practitioner;
(Nebraska I) ment Supreme Court advocate
Wisconsin v. state 1932 1936 (final Frederick F. Faville (1933)
Michigan boundary decree) Private practitioner
dispute
2002] 711
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Washington water ap- 1931 1936 William W. Ray (1933)
v. Oregon portion- (opinion) Private practitioner [repre-
ment sented state of Utah in
Arizona v. California]
Arizona v. water ap- 1930 1931 George I. HaightD(1954)
California portion- (dismissed Private practitioner;
ment without Supreme Court advocate
1953 prejudice) Simon Rifkind (1955)
2001 Private practitioner; for-
(supp. mer judge, federal district
decree) court; Supreme Court
advocate
Elbert P. Tuttle (1979)
Senior judge, federal court
of appeals
Robert B. McKayD (1989)
Private practitioner; Pro-
fessor Emeritus, New York
University School of Law;
Supreme Court advocate
Frank McGarr (1990)
Private practitioner; for-
mer judge, federal district
court; Supreme Court ad-
vocate
United suit to 1930 1935 (final Garret W. McEnerncy
States v. quiet title decree) (1931)
Oregon to land
New Jersey suit to en- 1929 1935 (final Edward K. Campbell
v. City of join water decree) (1933)
New York pollution _
New Jersey state 1929 1935 (final William L. Rawls (1930)
v. Delaware boundary decree) Private practitioner;
dispute Supreme Court advocate
New Jersey water ap- 1929 1954 (final Charles N. Burch (1930)
v. New York portion- order) Private practitioner;
ment Supreme Court advocate
Kurt F. Pantzer (1952)
Private practitioner;
Supreme Court advocate
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Michigan v. water ap- 1926 1980 (final Albert B. Maris (1979)
Illinois portion- order, sub Senior Judge, federal court
ment nom. of appeals; former judge,
Wisconsin federal district court;
v. Illinois) former Chief Judge, federal
Emergency Court of
Appeals
Wisconsin v. water ap- 1926 1980 (final Charles Evans Hughes
Illinois portion- (sub order, sub (1926)
ment nom. nom. Former Justice, Supreme
MI v. Wisconsin Court of the United States
IL) v. Illinois) Albert B. Mars (1979)
Senior Judge, federal court
of appeals; former judge,
federal district court; for-
mer Chief Judge, federal
Emergency Court of
Appeals
Louisiana v. state 1925 1931 Thomas G. Haight (1928)
Mississippi boundary Private practitioner;
dispute former judge, federal court
of appeals
Oklahoma v. state 1920* 1930 (final ErnestKnaebel!(1920)
Texas boundary decree) -
dispute Frederick S. Tyler (1921)
Joseph M. Hill (1925)
Georgia v. state 1919 1922 (final Charles S. Douglas (1920)
South boundary 1977 decree) Private practitioner;
Carolina dispute 1990 Supreme Court advocate
(opinion) Walter E. Hoffman (1978)
Senior judge, federal dis-
trict court
Pennsylvania Commerce 1919 1923 (final Levi Cooket (1920)
v. West Clause decree) Private practitioner;
Virginia challenge Supreme Court advocate
2002]
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Arkansas v. state 1917 1918 Monte M. Lemann (1937)
Tennessee boundary 1935 (opinion) Private practitioner; mem-
dispute 1968 1941 (final ber, Supreme Court's Advi-
decree) sory Committee on the
1970 (final Rules of Civil Procedure;
decree) former professor, Tulane
Law School; Supreme
Court advocate
Gunnar H. Nordbye (1968)
Senior judge, federal dis-
Itrict court
Vermont v. state 1915* 1937 (final Edmund F. Trabue (1930)
New boundary order) -
Hampshire dispute
New Mexico state 1913* 1931 (final Charles Warren (1924)
v. Texas boundary decree) Constitutional historian;
dispute lecturer, numerous univer-
sities; former Assistant
Attorney General
Colorado v. water ap- 1901* 1944 (final Charles C. Cavanah (1942)
Kansas portion- 1928 decree) Retired judge, federal dis-
ment 1995 trict court
Kansas v. water ap- 1901* 1907 Wade H. McCree, Jr.'
Colorado portion- 1986 (dismissed (1986)
ment 1999 without Professor, University of
prejudice) Michigan Law School; for-
1995 mer Solicitor General; for-
(opinion) mer judge, federal court of
2001 appeals, federal district
(opinion) court, and state trial court
Arthur L. Littleworth
(1987)
Private practitioner
Charles C. Cavanah (1942)
Retired judge, federal dis-
Itrict court
Pennsylvania Commerce 1849* 1855 (final R. Hyde Walworth
v. Wheeling Clause order) Former Chancellor of the
& Belmont challenge State of New York (com-
Bridge Co. . missioner)
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Huger v. undiscl. 1797 - (case commissions appointed to
South dismissed) examine witnesses
Carolina
Vanstophorst suit for col- 1791 - (case commissioners appointed
v. Maryland lection of settled) to take evidence
debt
Mississippi v. federal- - 1990 (final Honorable Walter P.
United state decree) Armstrong, Jr. (1988)
States boundary Retired judge; private
dispute practitioner; Supreme
Court advocate; former
President, ABA
New York v. water ap- - 1980 (final Albert B. Mars (1979)
fllinois portion- decree) Senior judge, federal court
ment of appeals; former judge,
federal district court; for-
mer Chief Judge, federal
Emergency Court of
Appeals
United Streeter B. Flynnt (1943)
States v. Private practitioner; Su-
Louisiana preme Court advocate
United federal- - 1993 (sup- Honorable Walter P. Arm-
States v. state plemental strong, Jr.R (-)
Louisiana boundary decree) Retired judge; private
(Alabama & dispute practitioner; Supreme
Mississippi Court advocate; former
Boundary President, ABA
Case)
Connecticut water di- 1928 1931 (case Charles W. Bunn (1929)
v. Massachu- version dismissed) Private practitioner;
setts Supreme Court advocate
United suit to - 1931 Charles Warren (1929)
States v. quiet title Constitutional historian;
Utah to river- lecturer, numerous univer-
beds sities; former Assistant
Attorney General
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